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Abstract 
International Asset Pricing and Exchange Rate Risk: 
Theoretical exposition, numerical analysis, and empirical investigation under 
integrated and frictional capital markets 
Sema Bayraktar 
Thomas C.Chiang, Supervisor 
 
 
 
 
This thesis examines the impact of exchange rate risk on asset pricing under varying 
market structures. To understand this effect, in the first part of the thesis the analytical 
derivation of an international asset-pricing model within a mean-variance framework is 
attempted. In the second part, to gain more insight to what the model shows 
economically, the price comparisons and changes in welfare under varying market 
structures are numerically analyzed. Finally, in the third part of the thesis the model is 
investigated empirically to check whether it is supported or not by real data.   
The main result of the theoretical part is that as long as representative agents are 
consuming the imported goods they would price the exchange rate risk in asset pricing. 
This is because exchange rate through terms of trade would affect the real purchasing 
power of the consumers. In numerical part, it is shown that, in a model with real 
exchange rate (also terms of trade in this study) shock-absorbing effect, there is no 
welfare increase on integration. Finally, empirical testing of the model provides partial 
support for the theoretical results of the first part.  
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Chapter 1 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
In international finance literature there are many studies that have theoretically analyzed 
the impact of the exchange rate uncertainty in asset pricing models (as a incomplete list, 
Grauer-Litzenberger-Stehle (1976), Solnik (1972, 1974) Adler and Dumas (1983) 
Zapatero (1995)). The results are inconclusive and depend on the assumptions of the 
particular model. On the other hand, there are not much empirical studies that examined 
the exchange rate uncertainty. Some early studies are also inconclusive (Solnik (1974), 
Stehle (1977)), however, the results of two recent studies by Dumas and Solnik (1995) 
and Santis and Gerard (1998) are consistent and conclude that the exchange rate is one of 
the important determinants in international asset pricing.  
Another important issue in international finance is market segmentation. Market 
segmentation, by creating heterogeneous investment opportunities for investors from 
different countries, changes the classic asset pricing models. Several studies on market 
segmentation, such as Errunza and Losq (1985), Eun and Janakiramanan (1986), Hietala 
(1989), Basak (1996) have already shown how market segmentation may cause 
heterogeneous portfolio selections and how it may change the asset pricing relations. But 
none of these studies have also incorporated the exchange rate risk, very important 
phenomenon created in international context, with the market segmentation. 
The objective of this study is to fill this gap in the market integration/segmentation 
literature. For that purpose, a two-country two-goods two-period model is developed and 
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the impact of exchange rate uncertainty on asset pricing under varying financial market 
structures is investigated. The model is a partial equilibrium model in the sense that it 
does not explain the causes of production shocks of two countries. The exchange rate 
enters to the model as the relative price of foreign good to the home good. Solnik (1977) 
asserts, “each imperfection in the trade or capital market might add another source of 
exchange risk”. Thus, it is expected that exchange rate risk should emerge to be important 
in asset pricing at least when markets are not integrated. 
The main result of the model is that as long as representative agents are consuming 
the imported goods they would price the exchange rate risk in asset pricing. This is 
because exchange rate through terms of trade would affect the real purchasing power of 
the consumers. As Heckerman (1972) once put it wisely, the agents who consume 
imported goods “mislead themselves if they assume domestic currency value and real 
purchasing power are synonymous (page 382)”.  
In addition, the fundamental relationship between two risk-free rates is derived. It is 
shown that when exchange rate uncertainty exists, different countries' nominal risk-free 
rates can be substitute to each other only after they are adjusted by their respective 
“discount factor for purchasing power”. Risk-free bonds behave like risky equity assets 
since purchasing power bonds are attached to them. Thus they enlarge the investment 
opportunities of agents. Specifically, agents use bond markets to enhance the risk sharing 
when the markets are segmented.  
In the second part of the thesis, whether the welfare of countries increases on market 
integration or not is analyzed by using a numerical methodology. This is also a 
controversial topic in the literature. The studies by Subrahmanyam (1975) and Errunza 
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and Losq (1989) emphasize the diversification (risk sharing) effects and conclude that 
welfare of countries would increase on integration. Basak (1996), in a more realistic 
model, establishes that there are two important driving factors that determine the welfare 
of the countries on integration; increased diversification opportunity that has a positive 
effect on the welfare and consumption smoothing effect that has an ambiguous effect on 
the welfare. Khang Min Lee (1997) adds one more driving factor determining the 
welfare: efficient capital allocation. Her numerical results show that when the share of 
capital in the production function is unity, the welfare of the country is better under 
asymmetric financial market segmentation and when it is less than unity the welfare of 
the country is better under complete integration. Since the empirical literature suggests 
that share of capital is less than one, the author concludes that the financial market 
integration should be the Nash equilibrium. 
The welfare analysis in this thesis follows one by Cole and Obstfeld (1991). Their 
main argument is that since a country's terms of trade is negatively correlated with 
country-specific productivity shocks, all the risk sharing is achieved through terms of 
trade responses to shocks. Thus, in their study gains from the risk sharing in a model with 
terms of trade are nil. However, their model does ignore the investment. The contribution 
of welfare analysis in the present study will be to capture the role of investment in a 
model with real exchange rate, which equals to terms of trade due to the assumptions in 
the model. The expectation is that welfare changes in such a model should be even 
smaller than what is found in a model without terms of trade shock absorbing effect. The 
results support this expectation. It is found that the coefficient that measures the welfare 
change from one market structure to the other is not significantly different from zero.   
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By using numerical method also security price comparisons, which are analytically 
insolvable due to computational difficulties, can be obtained. The findings related to 
security price comparisons in the literature also change from study to study. Some early 
one-period models (Errunza and Losq (1985), Eun and Janakiraman (1986)) show that 
unconstrained assets' prices remain unchanged and constrained assets' prices increase on 
integration. Contrary to this previous literature, Basak, by solving an intertemporal 
model, concludes that unconstrained assets' prices decrease on integration, whereas the 
constrained assets' prices behave ambiguously. Finally, Khang Min Lee (1997) finds 
consistent results with Basak in terms of security price changes on integration and shows 
that unconstrained assets' prices decrease on integration. Due to the existence of  
stochastic exchange rate in the model of this thesis, it is expected that price comparisons 
would also be different from ones in the previous market segmentation/ integration 
literature. Indeed, under some specific assumptions, the results show that assets' prices 
and interest rates remain unchanged on integration in a model with exchange rate. 
Finally, the numerical results demonstrates that this model can explain the well known 
"home bias" puzzle, since the investment on unconstrained asset on mildly segmented 
market by unrestricted agent is consistently found to be small.   
Finally, in the third part of the dissertation the model is tested empirically to check if 
the data support the pricing equations derived in the first part of the thesis. The third part 
of the study uses a multivariate GARCH model to estimate time-varying risks. The 
results support the theory only partially. Although the premiums for "exchange rate risks" 
are considerably smaller than the premium of market risk, they are significantly 
important in explaining the dynamics of the security returns. However, restrictions 
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predicted by the models are not achieved and the adjusted R2s are not high. Moreover, 
the segmented market model and the integrated market model are compared empirically 
to determine which model has more power in explaining international returns. Although 
the comparison tests are a bit more in favor of the segmented market model, they imply 
that neither of the models is superior to the other as an asset-pricing model. 
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. The next chapter provides a literature 
review on research pertaining to the issues addressed in this study. Chapter three presents 
the model and its pricing equations. Chapter four studies the welfare gains under varying 
market structures. Chapter five empirically tests the proposed security pricing relations in 
chapter three. Chapter six provides a summary of the results and a discussion of the 
assumptions and the modeling approach adopted in the thesis. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Literature Review 
 
 
In this chapter the relevant literature to this thesis will be reviewed. The chapter will be 
divided into two sections. Both sections are about the studies on international asset 
pricing.  However, the studies in the first section examine the effects of exchange rate 
and the ones in the second section investigate the effects of different market structures on 
international asset pricing.  
 
2.1 The Effects Of Exchange Rate On International Asset Pricing 
 
The relevancy of the exchange risk in pricing securities is a very controversial issue in 
the international finance area. There are basically two camps over the discussion. On one 
side, Grauer-Litzenberger-Stehle (1976) (GLS) claim that exchange rate risk is nothing 
but a “money illusion”. On the other side, Solnik (1972, 1974) argues that the exchange 
rate risk is one of the fundamental variables that should be considered in international 
asset pricing.  
GLS (1976) derive closed-form asset pricing equations in a multi-good and two-
period environment. They show that, when purchasing power parity (PPP) holds and all 
investors have identical consumption tastes, the asset prices depend on the payoff from 
the asset and on the marginal utility of aggregate world real wealth and asset payoff. 
They also analyze the case where commodity trade restrictions exist and find out that in 
this case optimal portfolios are different for investors from different countries. However, 
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they conclude that this is because of the different relative prices but not because of the 
different numeraire currencies that investors face. Thus, what matters in asset pricing 
according to GLS is not the exchange rate but the relative price of the commodities.  
Fama and Farber (1979) and Adler and Dumas (1983) also support GLS. According 
to Fama and Farber, the existence of PPP and the integrated markets are sufficient 
conditions for real returns of the securities to be same for investors from different 
countries. Adler and Dumas even disqualify the PPP deviations as a reason for the 
existence of exchange rate risk but they claim that commodity price parity (CPP) 
deviations may create exchange rate risk. 
On the other hand, in Solnik’s (1974) study the inflation is zero and deviations from 
PPP are due to the investors’ different consumption tastes. Solnik defines this exchange 
risk due to the PPP deviations as the “real exchange risk”. He assumes that covered 
interest rate parity holds, thus exchange rate can be hedged by borrowing in the relevant 
country. For the case where the stock market risk is independent from exchange risk he 
finds that a three-fund separation theorem holds. According to this theorem every 
investor would hold a combination of “ a portfolio of all stocks hedged against exchange 
risk (the world market portfolio), a portfolio of bonds, speculative in the exchange risk 
dimension and the risk free asset of their residence country”. Solnik (1972) also 
investigates the more general case where the stock market risk is not independent of 
exchange risk.  In that case investors hold a combination of four funds. More importantly, 
stock investments cannot be hedged perfectly against exchange risk any more. 
Unfortunately, Solnik reports that the composition of these funds is very complex and not 
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intuitively appealing. In short, contrary to GLS, for Solnik the exchange risk is far from 
being irrelevant in asset pricing. 
The strongest support, in my opinion, to Solnik’s theory comes from an older study 
by Heckerman (1972). Heckerman in a two-country two-good model examines the effects 
of exchange rate on the optimal portfolio selection. He creates a wealth function, which 
decreases by the increase in relative price of consumption goods (since the good prices 
can be assumed to be equal to one, the relative price is also the exchange rate). He shows 
that the consumption pattern of an investor is a very important factor in determining the 
optimal portfolio. As long as the investor consumes imported goods he/she cannot ignore 
the changes in the relative price of consumption goods and would hedge the relative price 
uncertainty by purchasing the asset denominated in foreign currency (foreign risk-free 
bond in this study). Heckerman’s model unfortunately does not include risky securities, 
thus falls short of showing the effects of exchange rate on risky security pricing. 
In a separate paper by Zapatero (1995) the investors are also assumed to consume 
both domestic and foreign goods. However, in this two-country continuous-time model, 
Zapatero concludes “equilibrium exchange rates make the risky security of foreign 
market redundant to the risky security of the domestic market from the point of view of 
the domestic investor”. Like Heckerman’s paper, Stulz (1981) also recognizes the 
importance of the consumption patterns and analyzes the case where consumption 
opportunity sets are different across countries. However, he does not consider the 
consumption of foreign good by domestic investor and vice versa. He finds out that the 
covariance of the home-country return of risky security with changes in world real 
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consumption rate is the main determinant of excess real expected return of a risky 
security. According to Stulz, exchange rate risk can be hedged, thus, it is not priced. 
In summary, in literature there is no agreement even about whether the exchange rate 
uncertainty is one of the determinants in risky security pricing or not. If it is, how it 
affects the pricing equation remains also as a challenge. 
 
2.2 The Effects Of Market Structures On International Asset Pricing 
 
The other important issue in international finance that would also cause investors from 
different countries to hold different portfolios is market segmentation. Several studies on 
market segmentation, such as Errunza and Losq (1985), Eun and Janakiramanan (1986), 
Hietala (1989), Basak (1996) have already shown how market segmentation may cause 
heterogeneous portfolio selections. But none of these studies have incorporated exchange 
rate risk, the other important phenomenon created in international context, with the 
market segmentation. 
The study by Cohn and Pringle (1973) can be taken as the beginning of the history of 
integration of markets literature. They analyze the effects of market integration on risk 
premia and point out that as long as the new securities that are added to the investors' 
portfolio by the integration of markets are not perfectly correlated with the old ones, the 
risk premia will decrease due to two effects; decrease in slope of Capital Market Line and 
decrease in non-diversifiable risk of the security. However, they abstract their theoretical 
discussion from two important factors: the change in the risk-free rate as the markets are 
integrated and exchange rate risk. Authors claim that with the integration of markets the 
risk-free rate should increase and that would also lead to a decrease in the slope of capital 
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market line. According to them relatively high levels of risk premia are due to market 
imperfections. 
On the other hand, the derivation of international asset pricing models under frictional 
market starts with the Black's classics study in 1974. Black's two-country model 
formalizes the taxes on the value of an individual's net holdings of assets in countries 
other than his/her own as the friction in the market, i.e. investor with a short position in 
foreign holdings will pay a negative tax. Black, in a mean variance framework, shows 
that the deviations from the CAPM are due to this tax differential between countries. He 
also establishes that the direction of the deviations from CAPM due to tax differential is 
consistent with the results of empirical studies that show high β securities with expected 
returns lower than predicted by the CAPM and low β securities with expected returns 
higher than predicted by the CAPM. He specifies the optimal portfolios that investors 
hold as a mixture of 1) the international market portfolio, 2) the international minimum 
variance zero β portfolio of risky assets – individuals in the low interest rate country hold 
positive amounts and those in the high interest rate country hold negative amounts-, 3) a 
long position(s) in other country’s (countries') minimum variance constant tax 
portfolio(s), and 4) a short position in the given country’s minimum variance constant tax 
portfolio. Finally, as the most efficient test of the presence of direct or indirect 
restrictions on international investment, the comparison of the mean return on the 
international minimum variance zero β portfolios of risky assets with the international 
average short-term interest rate is determined. 
Stulz (1981) also formalizes taxes as to model the friction in international markets. 
However the investor in his study would pay taxes on absolute value rather than the net 
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value of his/her holdings of foreign holdings. Thus, Stulz obtains different results from 
those of Black’s model. To simplify the model he assumes that only domestic investors 
face the taxes on their foreign holdings. There are two conclusions that Stulz establishes 
in his study. First, in each country, all investors hold the same portfolio of risky assets. 
However, Stulz does not determine the nature of the portfolio held by the investors. 
Second, some foreign assets are non-traded. Since there are some non-traded foreign 
assets, for investors who face barriers to international investment, the world market 
portfolio is inefficient. Finally, Stulz establishes that there is a β* such that all assets with 
a larger beta must be traded. Thus he claims checking whether a SML estimated using 
only assets with a high beta has a different slope from one estimated using only assets 
with a low beta or not is a way of testing the existence of the barriers. 
The study by Errunza and Losq (1985) introduces to the segmentation-integration 
literature a more realistic intermediate market structure that they name as “mildly 
segmented market”. In the segmented market, investors cannot invest in other country's 
securities. In mildly segmented market, while unrestricted investors can invest in all 
securities available, the restricted investors can invest only in a subset of securities 
termed eligible. And finally in integrated market, all investors have access to all available 
securities. They assert that under mild segmentation the eligible securities are priced as if 
the markets are integrated, on the other hand ineligible securities command a positive 
super risk premium that is proportional to the "conditional market risk". Conditional 
market risk of a security is defined as the covariance between its return and the return on 
the market portfolio of all ineligible securities, the returns on all eligible securities being 
given. Errunza and Losq also conduct an empirical investigation of their mildly 
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segmented model. They attribute the weak empirical results to "the kinds of restrictions 
imposed in the real world, use of various proxies including risk free rate, and small 
sample size." 
The study of Errunza and Losq in 1989 develops a model of mild segmentation in a 
multi-country environment instead of two-country to capture multilateral structure of 
security returns. In this study international capital market has two regions; the core of the 
market consists of all those securities that can be traded by any investor, whereas in the 
periphery the investors can trade only in their own segment (the peripheral segments are 
effectively segmented and core investors cannot invest in peripheral segments). They find 
that core securities are priced as if the markets are integrated. The prices of securities in 
the Ith periphery depend on two risks; the covariance of ineligible security with the 
portfolio of core securities that is the most correlated with the world market portfolio 
(Ms) and the covariance of ineligible security with the portfolio of MhI, comprised of a 
long position in the Ith segment market portfolio (MI) and a short position in the best 
proxy of Ith segment portfolio available in the core (MsI). 
Eun and Janakiraman (1986) derives a closed-form of asset pricing model in a two 
country model where foreign investors have access to all securities in the market while 
domestic investors are limited to invest on foreign market at most a fixed fraction of all 
available foreign securities. Consistent with previous research, they also find out that the 
domestic (core) securities are priced as if the markets are not segmented. However, the 
foreign securities, subjected to the constraints, are priced differently in the domestic and 
foreign countries, reflecting the premia offered by the domestic investors and discounts 
demanded by the foreign investors. The arbitrage opportunity is prevented by other 
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restrictions put by foreign government so that foreign investors are not able to buy the 
foreign security at a lower price and sell it at a higher price to the domestic investors. The 
risk premium that domestic investors are willing to pay to avoid diversification loss is 
proportional to their risk aversion levels.  
In a very similar paper, Hietala (1989) analyzes the effects of an actual investment 
barrier where foreign investors can own at most a fraction of the stocks of many Finnish 
companies. Consistent with the findings of Eun and Janakiraman, Hietala shows that in a 
two country mean-variance environment, an unrestricted security is traded at a price 
premium (at identical prices) relative to the corresponding restricted stock if foreign 
investors require a lower rate of return (higher or same) on this stock than domestic 
investors do. The main difference between two studies is that since the latter one analyzes 
an actual investment barrier, thus the pricing model can be tested empirically. In 
empirical part, the author estimates the excess returns required by foreign and domestic 
investors separately by measuring "international beta" and "domestic beta" of the 
unrestricted security respectively. He finds that international betas are not significantly 
different than zero. Then price premiums should be positively correlated with domestic 
betas of the stocks. Empirical results support that conclusion. However, the size of the 
domestic betas empirically is not as high as estimated by the model. Hietala tries to 
explain this difference by market frictions. 
All studies mentioned so far are one-period mean variance models and treat interest 
rate as an exogenous variable, thus they fail to capture the effects of interest rate changes 
on security pricing as the markets integrate. On the other hand, there are some papers - 
Kazemi (1985), Sellin and Werner (1993) and Errunza and Losq (1989) - which analyze 
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the impact of market integration on interest rate, but do not examine the effect of the 
changes in the interest rate on asset pricing. The study by Basak (1996) fills this gap in 
market integration/segmentation literature. He solves an intertemporal model of 
international capital market segmentation where interest rate is treated as an endogenous 
variable. Following Basak, Khang Min Lee (1997) also treats interest rate as an 
endogenous variable but her main contribution is the addition of supply side of the 
economy to pricing model. 
Kazemi's model (1985) is a two-country cash-in advance model with a flexible 
exchange rate. Thus, in his model interest rates can be different in two countries both 
before and after the integration of markets. He also shows that the post-integration 
riskless rate in a country will be higher than the pre-integration rate if domestic and 
foreign investors have the same constant relative risk aversion. Sellin and Werner's 
results (1993) are consistent with his results. Sellin and Werner, in a two-country one 
good model, analyzes the changes in the riskless interest rate for two specific types of 
investment barriers: 1) a restriction on the fraction of the domestic capital stock that 
foreign investors are allowed to hold, and 2) a restriction on the amount of funds 
domestic investors can invest in foreign capital stock. They find that interest rate 
decreases as markets become partially segmented or interest rate increases as market 
moves from partially segmented to integrated case. However, their result is valid for the 
special case of logarithmic preferences for which there is no hedging against shifts in the 
interest rate (indirect effect). The only effect considered in this study on interest rate is 
through asset substitution (direct effect). Finally, Errunza and Losq (1989), in a one-
period multi country model with flexible exchange rates, also investigates the impact of 
  
15
 
integration of partially segmented market on interest rate via the introduction of a 
fixed-income security. According to Errunza and Losq the direction of change in the 
nominal interest rate would depend on the covariances between the exchange rate and 
two specially designed asset portfolios. 
Similar with these three studies above, Basak treats interest rate as an endogenous 
variable and investigates the price effects of segmentation in an intertemporal model. 
Consistent with the studies of Kazemi (1985) and Sellin and Werner (1993), he shows 
that interest rate would increase as markets integrate. However, his results in terms of 
asset pricing are significantly different than those of previous static (one-period) asset 
pricing literature. Errunza and Losq (1985), Eun and Janakiraman (1986) show that 
unconstrained assets' prices remain unchanged with integration and constrained assets' 
prices increase when markets integrate. Hietala (1989) also supports the latter result. 
Contrary to these studies, Basak finds that unconstrained assets' prices decrease on 
integration, whereas the constrained assets' prices behave ambiguously.  
Finally, Khang Min Lee (1997) studies the security price changes under varying 
market structures. Her study differs from previous literature in two respects. First, she 
endogenizes the choice of financial market integration. Second she combines the firm’s 
maximization problem with that of consumer’s. Thus her results have some policy 
implications and she is able to show the effects of integration for varying values of 
capital share in the production technology of the countries. However, she is only able to 
obtain numerical results but not analytical results for her model. Lee shows that 
regardless of capital share in the production technology interest rate would increase on 
integration. This result is consistent with Sellin and Werner (1993) and Basak (1996) 
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where production is assumed to exhibit constant returns to scale. Lee also finds 
consistent results with Basak in terms of security price changes on integration. She also 
shows that unconstrained assets' prices decrease on integration.     
Another important question that one would naturally ask when the subject is the 
integration of markets is whether the welfare of countries or individuals increases on 
integration. The studies by Subrahmanyam (1975) and Errunza and Losq (1989) 
emphasize the diversification effects and conclude that welfare of countries would 
increase on integration. Basak (1996), in a more realistic model, establishes that there are 
two important driving factors that determine the welfare of the countries on integration; 
increased diversification opportunity that has a positive effect on the welfare and 
consumption smoothing effect that has an ambiguous effect on the welfare. He specifies 
five aspects that determine the direction and the extent of a country's consumption 
smoothing behavior; initial endowment, productivity at time 1, relative impatience, 
relative risk aversion, relative intertemporal substitution. A country’s welfare may 
decrease significantly on market integration, if the country is borrowing for the 
consumption smoothing forward purposes and this effect dominates the diversification 
effect. It is even possible for a lender country to end up with negative welfare on 
integration if it is endowed with sufficiently little of the initial endowment.  
Khang Min Lee adds one more driving factor determining the welfare: efficient 
capital allocation. She shows that with constant returns of scale (when the capital share in 
the production technology is unity), the borrower country would be better off with 
asymmetric financial market segmentation because it can borrow at a lower rate to invest 
in a risky asset with a higher rate of return. However, she argues that with decreasing 
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returns to scale in capital (when the capital share in the production technology is less 
than unity), complete financial market integration is the Nash equilibrium. Because, in 
the mildly segmented market the price of the traded risky asset tends to increase when the 
share of capital in the production technology decreases. In order to partially share its 
output risk, the borrower needs to purchase the risky asset at a higher cost. Apparently, 
this cost is higher than the benefit gained by borrowing at a lower rate so that her 
numerical results show the welfare of the country is better under complete integration 
when the share of capital in the production function is less than one. Since the empirical 
literature suggests that share of capital is less than one, the author concludes the financial 
market integration should be the Nash equilibrium. 
In conclusion, the findings about both the impact of exchange rate risk and 
segmentation on asset pricing and the welfare changes of countries on integration are 
mixed in the literature. The results basically depend on the model specification. This is 
the motivation of the present study that incorporates real exchange rate risk with the 
market segmentation in a model and analyzes their impact on risky asset pricing and 
welfare of countries from different perspectives and using different methodologies. 
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Chapter 3 
 
International Asset Pricing With real Exchange Rate and Investment Barriers 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, the controversy in the literature about the effects of exchange rate 
uncertainty on asset pricing has been shown. It has been discussed that the studies in the 
literature either have concluded that exchange rate is irrelevant or it can be hedged or 
were unable to obtain meaningful closed-form pricing models with exchange rate. The 
purpose of this chapter is to investigate the effects of exchange rate uncertainty on asset 
pricing and develop a closed–form international asset pricing model under varying 
financial market structures. For that purpose, two separate cases, one with real exchange 
rate and the other with monetary exchange rate, are analyzed.  
The model developed for the case with real exchange rate is basically a generalization 
of the pure endowment economy of Basak (1996). However, the model here includes 
exchange rate uncertainty and also assumes there are two separate riskless securities, 
each of them belonging to different countries. This model is similar to Solnik’s study 
(1974) in the sense that the risk analyzed is the pure real exchange rate risk. The second 
model for the case with monetary exchange rate is obtained by modifying the original 
model as a cash-in advance model. In this case exchange rate risk is due to the changes in 
the foreign good’s price level, i.e. it is “monetary exchange rate”. Thus, this case would 
represent the environment investigated in the paper by Grauer, Litzenberger and Stehle 
(GLS).   
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This study differs from Solnik’s (1974) study in two important ways. First, the 
stock market risk is not independent of exchange rate risk. Solnik (1972) investigated the 
effect of exchange rate risk on asset pricing for a more general case where the stock 
market risk and exchange risk are correlated but he was unable to derive “intuitively 
appealing” results. Second, the effect of exchange rate on asset pricing is studied under 
varying financial market structures. This second factor also differentiates the present 
study from GLS’s study since GLS assume that markets are integrated. There is one more 
technical difference between the present and Solnik’s study. In Solnik’s study the 
inflation is assumed to be zero and deviations from purchasing power parity (PPP) due to 
the investors’ different consumption tastes is defined as “real exchange rate”. In the 
present study, PPP is assumed to hold and the real exchange rate is defined as the relative 
price of foreign good to home good. Since there is no money inflation, real exchange rate 
is also equal to terms of trade.  
The main result in this chapter is that as long as representative agents are consuming 
the imported goods they would price the exchange rate risk in asset pricing. This is 
because exchange rate would affect the real purchasing power of the consumers. The 
pricing equations under each market structure are developed. The fundamental 
relationship between two risk-free rates is also derived and shown that when exchange 
rate uncertainty exists, different countries nominal risk-free rates can be substitute to each 
other only after they are adjusted by their respective “discount factor for purchasing 
power”. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Following section presents the set-up 
and the model. In sections three and four, the asset pricing relations are derived and 
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analyzed for two different cases under varying market structures. In the first case with 
“real exchange rate” risk, real exchange rate is the relative price of foreign good to home 
good and it is stochastic. In the second case with “monetary exchange rate” risk, a 
simplified model, where exchange rate is nothing but the inflation in foreign country, is 
analyzed to gain more insight into the asset pricing relations. By investigating both cases 
under varying market structures this study attempts to clarify under what conditions 
exchange rate is important in asset pricing. Section five concludes the chapter.  
 
3.2 The Set-up and Model 
 
3.2.1 The Set-up 
 
 
It is assumed that there are two countries in the world, home (H) and foreign (F). The 
model is characterized by the following assumptions. 
A1. The capital market is perfect. 
A2. There are two riskless bonds and two risky securities. Bonds are in positive 
supply of zero with an initial price of P(0) (of home bond) and P*(0) (of foreign bond), and  
risk-free rate of return of RH and RF. The two risky securities are in positive net supply of 
one. 
A3. Investors’ utility function is of the negative exponential type. 
A4. There is one good produced by each country and there is no barrier in goods 
market. 
A5. Exchange rate is the relative price of foreign good to home good. 
Following Errunza and Losq (1985), three types of market structures are assumed to 
exist. In all cases investors can trade in both riskless bonds, in other words, bond market 
is integrated. Thus, what characterizes the type of market structure is the level of 
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segmentation in the risky security markets. In segmented market each country trades in 
only its own risky security. In mildly segmented market domestic country trades in both 
domestic and foreign risky securities but foreign country trades only in its own risky 
security. In other words, domestic security is the restricted security whereas foreign 
security is the unrestricted one. Finally, in integrated market both countries trade in both 
risky securities. 
 
3.2.2  Model 
 
The model here basically builds upon the one developed by Basak (1996) but exchange 
rate risk is also added. It is shown that this change significantly changes the asset pricing 
equations and complicates them. The model is a two-country two-period mean-variance 
model. Each country, home and foreign, is specialized in its endowment of a distinct 
good. Each country’s representative investor/consumer maximizes today’s (at time 0) 
consumption and tomorrow’s (at time 1) expected wealth. At time zero, each 
investor/consumer allocates the funds, WJ(0), over foreign and domestic goods, which 
constitute today’s consumption, and risky and riskless assets, which constitutes the 
tomorrow’s wealth.  
Mathematically, home representative agent maximizes 
  
 and foreign representative agent maximizes 
 
( ) ( ) (3.2)                                   )()()()( 1***0**01 0 **** CUCUCUs ss ββ +Ε=Ε=  =Υ
( ) ( ) (3.1)                                                            )()()( 1001 0 CUCUCUs ss ββ +Ε=Ε=  =Υ
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where the utility functions of U and U* are assumed to be increasing and strictly 
concave functions. β and β∗ are the subjective discount factors of home and foreign 
agents and assumed to be constants. Ct and Ct* are the composite real consumption 
indexes for home and foreign agents, respectively at time t. They are defined by the 
following constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) functions:  
 
where CJ is the consumption of good J (home and foreign) by the home agent. θ  is the 
elasticity of substitution between foreign and home goods consumed by the home agent. 
ω is the weight that shows the taste of the home agent. The variables with star (*) belong 
to the foreign agent and can be defined similarly.  
Money inflation is assumed to be zero in both countries and the prices of home good 
and foreign good are normalized to be 1. If s is the relative price of foreign good to home 
good (i.e. terms of trade or exchange rate since the prices are normalized to be one) then 
total expenditure functions of home and foreign agent are given as: 
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It is shown in the Appendix A that the consumption-based price index in domestic 
goods, P, and consumption-based price index in foreign goods, P*, corresponding to the 
above CES consumption indexes are the following: 
 
 
 
Price index is defined to be the minimum expenditure such that related consumption 
index is equal to 1. 
Now, the budget constraints can be defined. Each agent has budget constraints at time 
0 and 1. For the home agent the budget constraints are in terms of domestic goods. They 
are defined as follows at time 0 and at time 1, respectively.  
 
(3.10) 
For the foreign agent the budget constraints are in terms of foreign goods. They are 
defined as follows at time 0 and 1, respectively. 
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where qH and qF are home agent’s proportional holdings of home and foreign bonds. αΗ  
and αF are home agent’s proportional holdings of home and foreign securities. Related 
variables with (*) belong to the foreign agent and can be explained in a similar way. QH(t) 
and QF(t)  are the home and foreign security prices at time t. P(t) and P*(t) are the home and 
foreign consumption-based price indexes and also the home and foreign bond prices at 
time t. RH and RF are the nominal risk-free returns of home and foreign country. Finally, 
W(t) and W*(t) are the terminal wealth of home and foreign agents at time t. 
The consumption price indexes, P(t) and P*(t), have been defined as the minimum 
expenditures such that C(t) and C*(t) are equal to 1. Then Z(t)/P(t) and Z*(t)/P*(t), the ratios of 
spending, measured in home and foreign good terms, to the minimum price of a single 
unit of consumption index are equal to the levels of the total real consumption indices, 
C(t) and C*(t). Thus; 
 
and 
 
If above budget constraints (3.9 - 3.12) are reformulated by using equations (3.13) 
and (3.14) and dividing each term by the relevant consumption-based price indexes, the 
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budget constraints are converted into those with real terms. Then, for the home agent the 
budget constraints at time 0 and 1 becomes: 
 
 
 
 
For the foreign agent the budget constraints at time 0 and 1 becomes: 
 
 
where the new variables are defined as follows:  
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I and I* will be named as home and foreign “consumption based inflation rate”, 
respectively, that is, the percentage change in the consumption-based price index. It is 
important to emphasize here that since the inflation due to the changes in goods’ prices 
are assumed to be zero, the only reason for the change in the consumption-based price 
indices is the change in real exchange rate. I and I* may also “be viewed as a payoff from 
an ‘indexed’ or ‘purchasing power parity’ bond” (GLS-1976). Thus 1/I and 1/I* would be 
the prices of ‘purchasing power parity’ bonds. IR(t) is the “relative price ratio”, that is, 
ratio of foreign consumption-based price index to the home consumption-based price 
index at time t. 
From maximization problems, equations 3.1 and 3.2., it is seen that certainty 
equivalent values of time-1 consumption should be defined to solve this two-period 
model. By following Selden (1978), (1979) and Basak (1996), in order to allow a 
separation between intertemporal substitution in consumption and risk aversion, certainty 
equivalent time-1 consumption of home agent is defined via a function V (different than 
U) as follows1: 
 
To calculate CEQ, the distribution of C(1) should be known. It is not an easy issue 
since C(1) is not a linear function of its random components, and more importantly, 
                                                           
 
1 Please see Selden(1978),(1979) or Basak(1996) for details of defining CEQ. 
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exchange rate is the ratio of two random variables. Thus, in the present model, to 
determine the distribution, a Monte Carlo simulation was implemented. As long as it is 
assumed that the distribution of prices are normal and exchange rate is a ratio of two 
normal, the simulation shows that the distribution of C(1) can be approximated as a 
normal, too. The details of the simulation are provided in the Appendix B. Thus, 
 
 
CEQ*, certainty equivalent time-1 consumption of foreign agent could be calculated 
in a similar way.  
Let’s summarize the maximization problem of each country’s agent. Home agent 
would maximize 
 
subject to equations 3.15 and 3.16.  
Foreign agent would maximize 
 
subject to equations 3.17 and 3.18. There are also appropriate restrictions on proportional 
holdings of bonds and securities. The restrictions on security holdings would change 
depending on the level of security market segmentation.  
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In the rest of this chapter, the explained model is solved for two different cases 
when PPP holds. When PPP holds, the multiplication of IR(t)s(t) in above equations 
becomes equal to 1, thus equations are simplified.  
 
 
 
 
3.3 Case I: International Asset Pricing With Real Exchange Rate  
 
 
As indicated in Cohn and Pringle (1973), “given exchange rate risks, it is difficult to 
conceive of a single asset that would be “risk-free” to all investors in all countries”. 
Indeed in the present model, there are two nominal risk-free assets and due to existence 
of real exchange rate uncertainty none of them is real “risk-free”. They become real risk-
free assets for their related country’s agent only after they are deflated by the "discount 
factor for purchasing power".  
Result 1 gives the fundamental relationship between home and foreign nominal risk-
free rates.  
 
Result 1. Nominal interest rates are equalized only when they are adjusted by their  
 
respective “discount factor for purchasing power”(DfPP). 
 
where A=aa*/a+a*. 
 
Result 1 shows that home and foreign risk-free bonds can be substitute to each other 
only after they are deflated by their respective “discount factor for purchasing power”. 
( )[ ]),1(),1()1(1 *** FHF IACovIACovIER ϕϕ −−+
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The discount factor for home (foreign) purchasing power –DfHPP (DfFPP)- is the term 
multiplied by the nominal home (foreign) interest rate. There are basically three factors 
included in each of DfPPs; all of them are related to the inverse of consumption based 
inflation rates -prices of purchasing power parity bonds (1/I or 1/I*)-. The consumption 
based inflation rates, which in turn reflects the path of the relative price of importable, 
characterize the real risk free rates. On the other hand consumption based real riskless 
return is defined as the rate of interest on the consumption index C: that is giving up 1 
unit of C (C*) –home (foreign) consumption bundle- to buy a bond would entitle the 
buyer to a payment equivalent to 1+RH (1+RF) units of C (C*) one period later. The 
consumption based real interest rate would be equal to nominal risk free rate multiplied 
by the price of purchasing power parity bonds, i.e.  
 
 
Then the relationship in Result 1 can alternatively be expressed as  
 
Result 2: The equilibrium asset prices under varying market structures with real 
exchange rate uncertainty (i.e. when the terms of trade is stochastic) are given on Table 
3.1.  
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Asset pricing equations are quite complicated ones. They, when necessary, are 
expressed in terms of marginal rate of substitutions of home (MRS) and foreign (MRS*) 
agents. Unfortunately it is not possible to obtain closed form solutions for MRS and MRS* 
in terms of exogenous variables analytically.  
It is seen that besides the conventional terms -expected value of security, variance of 
security and covariance of security with the market portfolio (in a two country case with 
the foreign portfolio)- additional factors that characterizes the discount factor for 
purchasing power (DfPP) and the correlation between prices of two separate purchasing 
power parity bonds also enter to the asset pricing formula. Thus, with an exchange rate 
model similar to Solnik’s, even in integrated markets simply measuring all returns in real 
terms can not eliminate the risk emerged by the changes in real exchange rate. The 
currency that investors use is relevant in asset pricing because it is the factor that 
determines terms of trade, subsequently the changes in real purchasing power of the 
investors.  
The main and only difference of the asset pricing equation in integrated market from 
the conventional models is that nominal risk-free rate is not the only deflator any more. 
“Discount factor for purchasing power” also enters the equation as a deflator. In order to 
determine the “real” price of an asset, both of these deflators are needed. This is because, 
as explained in Result 1, nominal risk-free rate becomes real risk-free rate only after it is 
deflated by the discount factor for purchasing power, thus the real purchasing power of 
the equity is determined only after its payoff is deflated by the nominal interest rate plus 
discount factor for purchasing power.  
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It is a well-known fact that as markets are integrated the investment opportunity set 
is enlarged and internationally diversified portfolios can be created. In the present model, 
there are four risky securities, including home and foreign equities and home and foreign 
“purchasing power parity” bonds (PPP bond). One can think of these PPP bonds as 
attached to the nominal risk-free bonds, thus as agents buy or sell nominal risk free bonds 
they also buy or sell PPP bonds. For each agent, there are basically six separate 
diversification opportunities (or non-diversifiable risk) if the markets are integrated, 
namely, the correlation of equity real returns with home and foreign PPP bond returns 
(four), the correlation between two equity real returns (one), and the correlation between 
two PPP bonds (one). Since in the integrated market each agent would have the same 
investment opportunities and net supply of nominal risk-free bonds are zero, the risks due 
to PPP bonds are canceled out. In other words, since in integrated markets agents have 
access to all risky equities there is no unavailable diversification opportunities that they 
need to imitate by borrowing or lending, i.e. the demands for nominal risk-free bonds , 
thus for PPP bonds are zero. Thus the only relevant non-diversifiable risk in the 
integrated market that is going to affect the payoff of the asset is the risk measured by the 
correlation between two equity real returns (besides the expected value and the variance 
of the asset’s price). However, this is not the case as market imperfections are 
incorporated to the model.  
The asset pricing relations in the segmented and mildly segmented market look quite 
complicated. However, the main points that separate them from the conventional models 
can be clarified easily. First of all, contrary to the previous literature, in the present model 
neither home nor foreign agent marginal rate of substitution (MRS and MRS*) is equal to 
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either of the risk-free rate, thus they themselves enter to the pricing equations as 
deflators. Similar to Basak’s (1996) model neither marginal rate of substitutions nor risk 
free rates remain same as level of integration changes. Thus, the pricing equations for 
foreign security in integrated and mildly segmented market are not same. However, since 
the analytical solutions for marginal rate of substitutions are not possible to obtain, the 
asset price, interest rate, and welfare comparisons across market structures will be 
attained numerically in chapter four.  
It was discussed before that there are basically six diversification opportunities (or 
non- diversifiable risk) for each agent when the markets are integrated. When the markets 
are segmented for each agent there exist only three of these opportunities, namely, the 
correlation between the security’s real return and home or foreign PPP bond returns and 
the correlation between two PPP bond prices. In segmented and mildly segmented 
markets, agents try to imitate the unavailable diversification opportunities through 
borrowing and lending. Since not the same diversification opportunities are available to 
the agents, the risks associated with PPP bonds are not canceled out because of net zero 
supply of bonds as in the case of integrated markets. These risks are priced in the 
equations proportional to the similarity (or dissimilarity) of markets and preferences of 
agents. To put it differently, if the markets were perfectly positively correlated and agents 
had the same preferences, these risks would not be priced at all.  
For example, in the segmented market when home agent buys home security he/she 
would face with the PPP bond risks of ρ(1/I,ϕH) and ρ(1/I*,ϕH) since he/she would also 
try to imitate the unavailable diversification opportunities by borrowing/lending. On the 
other hand if foreign agent buys the foreign security he/she would face with PPP bond 
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risks of ρ(1/I,ϕF) and ρ(1/I*,ϕF) since foreign agent also tries to imitate unavailable 
diversification opportunities by borrowing/lending. In other words, home agent cannot 
exploit the diversification opportunity that may arise by the (low) correlation between 1/I 
and ϕF and/or between 1/I* and ϕF . On the other hand foreign agent cannot take 
advantage of diversification opportunities that may arise due to the (low) correlation 
between 1/I and ϕH and/or between 1/I* and ϕH . Thus, the price of home asset, besides 
conventional terms, would be affected by two additional factors of ρ(1/I,ϕH) and 
ρ(1/I*,ϕH) depending upon the difference in preferences, i.e. between 1)D and D*, 2) a 
and a*, and the difference in markets,  i.e. between 1)ρ(1/I,ϕH) and ρ(1/I,ϕF),  
2)ρ(1/I*,ϕH) and  ρ(1/I*,ϕF), and 3)E(1/I)/σ(1/I) and ρ(1/I,1/I*)E(1/I*)/σ(1/I*). Similarly, 
the price of foreign asset, besides conventional terms, would be affected by two 
additional factors of ρ(1/I,ϕF) and ρ(1/I*,ϕF) depending upon the difference in 
preferences, i.e. between 1)D and D*, 2) a and a*, and the difference in markets, i.e. 
between 1) ρ(1/I,ϕH) and ρ(1/I,ϕF),  2) ρ(1/I*,ϕH) and  ρ(1/I*,ϕF), and 3) E(1/I)/σ(1/I) 
and ρ(1/I,1/I*)E(1/I*)/σ(1/I*). 
 Let’s assume the preferences are exactly the same for a moment. Then, the risks 
related to PPP bonds, ρ(1/I,ϕJ) and ρ(1/I*,ϕJ), J=H,F, would be priced depending on how 
much they could be diversified if the markets were integrated. They could totally be 
diversified if the markets were perfectly negatively correlated. If the markets were 
positively correlated –i.e. if ρ(1/I,ϕH) with ρ(1/I,ϕF) and ρ(1/I*,ϕH) with ρ(1/I*,ϕF) were 
exactly the same – it would not be possible to diversify the risks related to PPP bonds 
even when markets are integrated. Since in that case all equities are identically risky with 
respect to PPP bonds, none of them would be penalized for that risk in segmented market.  
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In the mildly segmented case foreign security is priced as if the markets are 
integrated. However, as it was already explained above this asset pricing is not same with 
one in integrated market since the values of interest rates do change as markets are 
integrated. On the other hand, home security asset pricing equation includes the 
conventional terms plus some additional factors created due to the unavailable 
diversification opportunities in the markets. Explanations made in segmented market case 
would be valid for the home security pricing in the mildly segmented market, too. In 
addition, foreign agent does not have access to the diversification opportunity that could 
be created by (low) correlation between two securities, ρ(ϕF,ϕH), while home agent do 
have that access. Thus, this risk plays a very similar role to the risks created by PPP 
bonds and priced to the extent that markets and agent preferences are different. Finally, 
the interaction terms between these three risks -ρ(1/I,ϕH), ρ(1/I*,ϕH) and ρ(ϕF,ϕH)- and 
the second degrees of their levels enter to the equation, too. 
In summary, in integrated market there are two deflators that determines the real 
purchasing power of the equity prices, one of them is the nominal risk free rate, the other 
is the “discount factor for purchasing power”. When markets are not integrated, marginal 
rate of substitutions enter to the formulas directly and risky securities command a risk 
premium if they are correlated with PPP bonds (either foreign or home PPP bond). The 
magnitude of this risk premium would be proportional to the magnitude of a) this 
correlation, b) dissimilarity of markets, and c) dissimilarity of preferences of agents.  
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3.4      Case II: International Asset Pricing With Monetary Exchange Rate 
 
 
In order to analyze the case where the exchange rate is "monetary", the model in section 
3.3 is modified to be a cash-in advance model. There are two additional assumptions in 
this case which separates it from the previous one. First, the home and foreign goods are 
perfect substitutes, i.e. θ, the elasticity of substitution between foreign and home goods is 
equal to infinity. By this perfect substitution assumption terms of trade becomes equal to 
1. Second, there is no price inflation in home country. This assumption makes marginal 
rate of substitution of home agent equal to the home risk free rate. Thus in the following 
asset pricing equations home risk free rate is used as the relevant deflator to present the 
equations in their simplest versions. Two assumptions together cause the home 
consumption based inflation rate to be equal to 1. On the other hand, foreign consumption 
based inflation rate is still stochastic. It is equal to the change in the foreign good’s price 
level or the change in foreign exchange rate. The details about the model are given in 
Appendix C.  
The fundamental relationship between two nominal risk-free bonds for case II is 
given in Result 3. 
Result 3. Nominal interest rates are equalized only when they are adjusted by their 
respective “discount factor for purchasing power”(DfPP). 
 
where A=aa*/a+a*. 
Between two cases (Result 1 and 3) there is no essential difference. The relationship 
between two interest rates is simplified in Result 3 since discount factor for home 
( ) ( )[ ]),1(),1()1(11 *** FHFD IACovIACovIERR ϕϕ −−+=+
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purchasing power is equal to 1. In other words, in case II home nominal risk-free bond 
is equal to home real risk-free rate. 
 
Result 4. The equilibrium asset prices and portfolio rules under varying market 
structures when the exchange rate is monetary (i.e. when terms of trade is constant) are 
given on Table 3.2.  
 
Asset pricing equations are quite simplified compared to the previous case. Since 
there is no inflation in home country, there is no home PPP bond, either. Thus the risks 
due to home PPP bonds do not exist in the pricing equations any more. The explanations 
given in stochastic terms of trade case are still valid and are easier to observe in these 
quite simplified equations.  
It is worth to emphasize here that only when the markets are integrated and there is a 
real risk-free deflator (home risk-free rate in this case), the asset pricing equations do not 
incorporate any risk related to “purchasing power parity bonds” (PPP bond risks). 
Otherwise PPP bond risks enter to the formulas regardless of whether they are created by 
pure exchange rate uncertainty (case I) or changes in price levels (case II). Thus, it is 
concluded that by measuring all returns in real terms does not guarantee that asset-pricing 
relations would rule out the PPP bond risks, which can be the result of exchange rate 
uncertainty or price inflation or both.     
The asset demands show that in the integrated market the countries share the risk in 
proportion to their risk tolerance by holding A/a (for home agent) or A/a* (for foreign 
agent) of each risky asset. Since there is no risk sharing opportunity that cannot be 
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achievable in integrated market, the bonds are not needed to imitate the risky security 
markets. Thus the demand for either bond is equal to zero. 
In the mildly segmented market, foreign agent, in addition to his/her integrated 
market home asset holding, holds a “hedge portfolio”, 
 
ρ(ϕH,ϕF)σ(ϕH)/σ(ϕF)(1-ρ2(1/I*,ϕF)) 
 
of foreign asset that is best substitute to home risky security. However, to the degree that 
risky security markets can be imitated through the bond market foreign agent may hold 
less of that “hedge portfolio” by the following magnitude,  
 
- ρ(1/I*,ϕF) ρ(1/I*,ϕH)σ(ϕH)/σ(ϕF)(1-ρ2(1/I*,ϕF)). 
 
In the segmented market, both agents need to create hedge portfolios through bond 
markets as opposed to mildly segmented case where only foreign agent needs to create a 
hedge portfolio for home risky security. Thus both home and foreign agents’ risk 
tolerances would be determinants of foreign nominal risk-free asset demand when 
markets are segmented whereas in mildly segmented case only risk tolerance of foreign 
agent is important in determining its demand. In both mildly segmented and segmented 
markets, the agents do hold foreign nominal risk-free bond proportional to the 
dissimilarity of risky security markets and agents’ preferences. 
Proposition 1 compares the endogenous home interest rate under the various market 
structures.  
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Proposition 1. The equilibrium interest rates obey the following inequalities: 
 
 
 
First inequality would hold if and only if  
 
 
The domestic risk-free interest rate would decrease on moving from segmented 
market to mildly segmented market because of “consumption smoothing effect”. The 
domestic interest rate equates to each country’s marginal rate of substitution between 
time-0 consumption and time-1 (certainty equivalent) wealth. If we just follow the 
methodology used by Basak (1996) and imagine a world where there is an “aggregate 
world agent who consumes all the time-0 consumption in the economy and all the 
certainty equivalent time-1 wealth, domestic risk-free rate must also equal to his/her 
marginal rate of substitution”2. In the present model with purchasing power risk, the 
aggregate variance of agents’ wealth increases and the aggregate certainty equivalent 
time-1 wealth decreases on moving from segmented market to mildly segmented market 
case. (This might be due to unbalanced PPP bond risks.) If the interest rate was 
unchanged, the aggregate agent would like to smooth his/her consumption towards 
future, i.e., consume less and save more today. However since the aggregate time-0 
                                                           
 
 
2 Please refer to Basak (1996) for details of this methodology.  
,MSS RR ≥
 ifonly  and if  IMS RR ≥
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )HFHFFHHFF aIaIIaa ϕϑϕϕρϕϑϕρϕϑϕρϕρϕϑ ,,/1,/1,/1 ***** −=+
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1,1/I,,1/I2,1/I,,1/I ***22*2 ≥−++ FHFHFHFH ϕρϕϕρϕρϕρϕϕρϕρ
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consumption is fixed, to counteract this saving tendency interest rate should go down. 
This decrease in home interest rate also makes the expected rate of return of home equity 
large enough to counteract the tendency of home agents hold less of home risky assets in 
moving from segmented to mildly segmented case.  
Due to Result 3, the direction of the change in foreign interest rate on moving from 
segmented market to mildly segmented market would depend upon the sign of the 
deflator that makes the nominal foreign interest rate real interest rate (the sign of DfFPP).  
On moving from mildly segmented case or segmented case to integrated market case, 
the consumption smoothing effect on home interest rate becomes ambiguous. (It is also 
ambiguous for foreign interest rate, too). The direction of change in aggregate variance of 
agents’ wealth depends on the relationship between the correlations between PPP bond 
returns and risky equity returns and correlation between two risky equity returns. 
Depending on whether the aggregate variance would decrease or increase on integration, 
domestic interest rate would increase or decrease.  
Consistently, the expected change in interest rates due to risk sharing concerns is also 
ambiguous on integration. In integrated market home agents are no longer the only 
customers of home risky asset and do not need to hold all of home risky assets. Thus 
home agents would have some excess capital, which could be conveyed towards more 
consumption or more savings. If the choice were the latter that would cause an increase in 
interest rates. On the other hand, foreign agents no longer need to use bond market to 
create hedge portfolios on integration. Indeed there is no bond demand in integrated 
market by either of the agents. Foreign agents adjust their portfolios by substituting home 
risky assets for foreign risky assets and bonds. Thus bond interest rates would also be 
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expected to decrease on integration. Which effect dominates would depend on risk 
aversions of agents and the risk characteristics of the markets thus total effect due to risk 
sharing concerns would also be ambiguous.  
Proposition 2 gives the all asset price comparisons across market structures.  
 
 
Proposition 2: The inequalities that the equilibrium prices obey in the three market 
structures are given in Table 3.3. 
The previous static models (e.g., Errunza and Losq (1985), Eun and Janakiraman 
(1986), and Merton (1987)) concluded that the price of unrestricted asset (foreign asset) 
was unaffected on moving from the mildly segmented to integrated market case. The 
present model, is an intertemporal model as Basak’s study (1996) and consistent with his 
results, shows that the price of the unrestricted asset (foreign asset) changes as long as the 
value of real interest rate changes. However, in the present model, the direction of the 
change in unrestricted asset depends on that of interest rate change. In all remaining asset 
comparisons, besides interest rate changes, PPP bond risks also play a role and change 
the asset price comparisons significantly. In static models, the price of home risky asset 
would unquestionably decrease in moving from integrated market case to mildly 
segmented market case. However, here the price of restricted asset (home risky asset) 
may decrease or increase depending on interest rate ratio, “real attractiveness of the 
asset’s payoff in integrated market” which is just the certainty equivalent of the payoff 
multiplied by a specially designed deflator with PPP bond risks. In moving from 
integrated to mildly segmented case the demand for home asset would decrease since 
foreign agents no longer have access to it. An increase in interest rate would enhance that 
decrease in demand since agents would substitute to the bonds from assets. But, a 
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decrease in interest rates would leave the total effect on price of home risky asset 
inconclusive. There is no change in demand to foreign asset in moving from integrated 
case to mildly case due to changing opportunity sets. The only change in the demand of 
foreign risky asset is due to changes in interest rate. If the interest rate decreases on 
moving from integrated market case to mildly segmented case then the price of foreign 
asset would increase and vice versa. 
Besides playing the role of a deflator in asset price comparisons, PPP bond risks also 
determines the absolute attractiveness of the asset’s payoff in all remaining price 
comparisons. The attractiveness of asset’s payoff is adjusted depending on how the 
payoff can be imitated through the bond markets. The implication of these both effects of 
PPP bond risks, as deflator and adjuster, is that the bias of the previous models compared 
with the intertemporal model with PPP risk is to overestimate the attractiveness of the 
asset’s payoff.  
 
3.5     Conclusions 
 
 
This study extends the previous investment barriers literature by including the changes in 
exchange rate risk as an additional uncertainty. To analyze the effects of exchange rate 
uncertainty, two cases are investigated; in case I real exchange rate uncertainty is the pure 
reason behind the changes of terms of trade, thus PPP bond risks. In case II exchange rate 
is nothing but the inflation rate. PPP bond risks still exist in this case due to money 
inflation. The findings from both cases show that PPP bond risks, whether they are 
created by pure exchange rate changes or inflation or both, would be priced in asset 
pricing equations even when markets are integrated. Conventional asset pricing equations 
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would hold when investors restrict the consumption to their respective country’s goods 
since by not consuming importable goods they would avoid the uncertainty related to 
relative prices, thus PPP bond risks. In other words, “choices among assets cannot be 
made independently of preferences for consumption goods when relative prices may 
change (Heckerman (1972))”. Another sufficient condition for conventional asset pricing 
equations to hold would be the existence of real risk-free rate and integrated markets. 
Because in integrated markets PPP bond risks are canceled out and there is no need for 
“discount factor for purchasing power” as a second deflator when there exits a real risk-
free rate. 
It is also shown in this chapter that when exchange rate uncertainty exists, different 
countries nominal risk-free rates can be substitute to each other only after they are 
adjusted by their respective “discount factor for purchasing power”. Risk-free bonds 
behave like risky equity assets since purchasing power bonds are attached to them. Thus 
they enlarge the investment opportunities of agents. Specifically, agents use bond 
markets to create portfolios that can facilitate the risk sharing when markets are 
segmented. The greater the difference between markets and the agents' preferences, the 
higher the risk premium paid for the PPP bond risks in risky securities pricing equations.  
For case II interest rate and risky asset comparisons under varying market structures 
are made. It is found that interest rate would decrease in moving from segmented market 
case to mildly segmented market case. The directions of all other comparisons are not 
conclusive.  For case I, the same comparisons are obtained by a numerical analysis in the 
next section. 
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   Chapter 4 
 
Welfare Gains On Financial Market Integration 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter tries to analyze the changes in the welfare of countries on integration of 
financial markets. The existence of real exchange rate in the model is expected to have a 
direct impact on welfare changes on integration. This is due to theoretical negative 
correlation between terms of trade (also the real exchange rate in the model) and output 
shocks of countries. Since output shocks are absorbed through terms of trade changes, the 
risk due to exogenous output is insured even in segmented markets. This implies that 
risk-sharing gains on integration would be smaller than what is found in a model without 
exchange rate if the only uncertainty to the economy is through the output shocks.  
The welfare impact of terms of trade has been examined previously by Cole and 
Obstfeld (1991). They have shown that since a country's terms of trade is negatively 
correlated with country-specific productivity shocks, all the risk sharing is achieved 
through terms of trade responses to shocks. Thus, in their study gains from the risk 
sharing in a model with terms of trade are nil. However, their model does ignore the 
investment. The contribution of welfare analysis here is to capture the role of investment. 
The model here (thus the simulation), similar to Basak's model, captures two driving 
factors that determine the welfare of the countries on integration: increased 
diversification opportunity and consumption smoothing effect. Apart from Basak's 
model, it also captures terms of trade shock absorbing effects. Therefore, given Cole and 
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Obstfeld (1991) study, expected diversification gains on integration should be even 
smaller than what Basak has obtained. Hence, it is possible that consumption smoothing 
effect dominates the diversification effect, if any, and the likelihood that net welfare 
effect might be negative on integration is even higher in this study. The results of the 
numerical analysis confirm that prediction. Under a reasonable calibration, numerical 
analysis shows that welfare gains are not significantly different from zero.  
The numerical analysis also provides security price comparisons of which analytical 
solution fails to provide due to computational difficulties. It is shown that there is no 
significant change in asset prices on integration in a model where all disturbances are 
absorbed through terms of trade. Finally, the numerical results show that a model with 
exchange rate can explain the well-known "home bias" puzzle.  
This chapter is organized as follows. The next section explains the model and the 
numerical methodology used. Section three examines the results of the analysis. Section 
four concludes the chapter. 
 
 
4.2 The Model and Numerical Methodology  
 
In this chapter, the model analyzed is the one with real exchange rate (case I) derived in 
chapter three. Since the model has already been explained previously, a detailed 
explanation is avoided here. It is a two-period model with two countries, each of which 
producing one good. In this simplified economic model, terms of trade is equal to real 
exchange rate. Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) is assumed to hold. 
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Following Cole and Obstfeld (1991), the simulation model is a two-country version 
of the model used by Mehra and Prescott (1985). Each national output is assumed to 
follow a two-state Markov process, with two states corresponding to "high growth" and 
"low growth". This implies four states that define the economy at each time t. If εH and εF 
are stochastic growth rates of home country and foreign country in that order, the home 
and foreign outputs, YH and YF respectively, are assumed to follow these following 
processes. 
 
To simulate the output processes, the study here follows Cole and Obstfeld method. 
According to that, the simulation model is calibrated so that the mean (1.8 percent per 
year), standard deviation (2.7 percent per year), and first lagged autocorrelation (0.102) 
of either country's output growth rate match to those of the United States annual per 
capita output growth rate over the years 1968-1987. Also the contemporaneous 
correlation coefficient (0.375) between the two countries' growth rates are chosen to be 
equal to that between U.S. and Japanese per capita growth over the same period. Cole and 
Obstfeld assume that the four possible states for the economy would be: 
 
State 1:  εH  = 0.045,  εY = 0.045, 
State 2: εH  = 0.045,  εY = -0.009, 
State 3:  εH  = -0.009,  εY = 0.045, 
State 4: εH  = -0.009,  εY = -0.009. 
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t
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52
 
The transition matrix of which each element (πij) shows the probability of moving 
from state i to state j is given as: 
 
In other words, the matrix above gives us the conditional probabilities of each state. 
The implied steady-state distribution described by the unconditional probabilities is given 
by the following vector: 
 [π1  π2  π3  π4] = [0.344 0.156 0.156 0.344].  
Cole and Obstfeld have set up the model so that the two countries are perfectly 
symmetric under portfolio autarky (segmented market case). This implies that in 
integrated market, where a perfectly pooled equilibrium exists, wealths of two countries 
are equal to each other. The numerical results (when the countries are identically 
calibrated) show that this is indeed the case. Cole and Obstfeld compare this perfectly 
pooled equilibrium with autarkic equilibrium. In the present study, mildly segmented 
market case is also taken to be one of the possible (practically the most realistic one) 
market structures. Numerical analysis compares the welfare gains among these three 
different market structures; namely segmented, mildly segmented and integrated. 
Given the initial output levels, the initial pair of growth rates, (εH and εF), are drawn 
from the steady-state distribution. Subsequent growth rates are drawn from the 
conditional distribution matrix. These growth rates would generate the output levels for 
∏
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=
0.600     0.050     0.050     0.300
0.110     0.222     0.558     0.110
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an economy that lasts for 50 years. There are four exogenous variables in the present 
study: two national outputs and two security prices. For simplicity it is assumed that each 
security price is perfectly correlated with its own country's output.  
Assuming that agents have homogeneous preferences, exchange rate would be the 
weighted ratio of two national outputs, 
where ϖ is the parameter that shows the taste of the home agent, which is assumed to be 
equal to that of foreign agent, and θ is the elasticity of substitution between home and 
foreign goods. The parameter ϖ can take a value between 0 and 1. In the benchmark case 
ϖ is accepted to be equal to 0.8. Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1994) suggest that θ 
should be between 1 and 2 for the United States, and even smaller values for Japan and 
an aggregate of European countries. Thus, θ is calibrated as 1.1 in the benchmark case of 
the following numerical analysis.  
Once using the formula above generates the exchange rate, the price indices are 
generated according to the equations (3.7) and (3.8) in chapter three. They are repeated 
here for the completeness. 
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There had to be two deviations from the original model to achieve reasonable 
results in the numerical methodology. First, inflation rate had to be defined as the change 
in price indices rather than using the theoretical definition given in chapter three due to 
computational problems. Second, the real security prices are assumed to be equal to the 
output levels without scaling them by price indices. Along with these lines, inflations and 
security price vectors are created. Then, all variances and covariances of the variables 
(home and foreign security prices, inflations) are computed. By using Euler equations 
(there are eight Euler equations with respect to the investment levels) all unknowns are 
defined in terms of marginal rate of substitution of home (MRS) and foreign agents 
(MRS*). Finally, MRS and MRS* are solved by using their definitions and budget 
constraints at t=0 and t=1.  
The welfare function for each country i=H,F under market structure k=segmented, 
mildly segmented, integrated is defined to be 
 
The welfare effects of moving from market structure k to market structure l is 
measured by the fractional permanent reduction/enhancement in consumption (at time 0 
and 1) required to provide the same utility level under market structure k with market 
structure l. In other words, the total measure δk,l of the welfare change on moving from 
market structure k to market structure l is given by  
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The discount factor β is calibrated as 0.98 in the benchmark case. The parameters 
that define risk aversion, a, and intertemporal substitution, b, are chosen to be 2 and 0.01 
respectively by trial and error so as to provide most reasonable real interest rates, in the 
range of 10-40 percent.  
An sensitivity analysis is also implemented to check if the results are robust to the 
changes in the calibration. For that purpose four additional cases besides the benchmark 
case are examined. Following chart shows the calibration in these four separate cases: 
 
         Benchmark Case                 Case I              Case II            Case III          Case IV 
a  2.0   2.0  2.0  2.0  2.0 
b               0.01   0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01 
ϖ   0.8   0.8  0.8  0.1  0.8 
θ  1.1   1000  0.1  0.1  0.1 
βH  0.98   0.98  0.98  0.98  0.98 
βF  0.98   0.98  0.78  0.98  0.98 
εH  7.0   7.0  7.0  7.0  9.52 
εF  7.0   7.0  7.0  7.0  4.48 
 
where εH and εF are the initial wealth of home and foreign country's representative agent, 
respectively. In the chart, for each case what is different from the benchmark case is 
written in bold.  
   
4.3 Numerical Results 
 
 
Numerical results are presented in Tables 4.1-4.5. Each table exhibits the security prices, 
real risk-free rates, portfolio weights, welfares under different market structures and total 
measures δk,l of the welfare change on moving from market structure k to market 
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structure l . Before discussing the numerical results, it would be more appropriate to 
explain how a financial structure would affect the welfare of the agent. Whether an agent 
will be better off with varying levels of integration depends on the changes in risk-free 
interest rate, asset prices and whether the agent is a net borrower or lender in a specific 
market structure. How much an agent have to invest on assets (foreign or home equities) 
to diversify his/her risks would determine whether the agent would be the net borrower or 
net lender in any particular market structure. The magnitude of the cost (or benefit) of 
being net borrower would depend on the interest rates on that particular market structure. 
Thus, the welfare comparisons from one market structure to another would depend on 
mainly two effects; diversification effect determined by the investment structure of the 
agent and "consumption smoothing effect (Basak (1996))" determined by whether the 
agent is a lender or borrower and the level of risk-free interest rate. The diversification 
effect on integration should be positive by definition. But, in a model with "terms of trade 
shock absorbing effect" like here, it is expected to be smaller than what is found in 
previous studies. On the other hand, consumption smoothing effect could be positive or 
negative depending on whether the agent is a lender or borrower and whether the interest 
rates are increasing or decreasing on integration. Thus, its net welfare effect on 
integration is not clear. The aim of the numerical analysis here is to investigate the net 
effect of these three forces on determination of the welfare across market structures; 
namely the diversification effect, consumption smoothing effect, and terms of trade shock 
absorbing effect. 
Table 4.1 presents the results of benchmark case. The interest rates given in the table 
are the "real" interest rates. The reader should have observed that there is only one 
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interest rate although the model assumes the existence of two separate bonds. This is 
because the real interest rates are equal to each other. This is the manifestation of the 
fundamental relationship that has been set up in chapter three. Contrary to the previous 
literature, this numerical analysis shows that the real interest rates do not significantly 
change on integration. Moreover, security price comparisons also show that prices do not 
change significantly form moving one market structure to the other. When the portfolio 
weights are examined a couple results emerge. One, neither of the agents can be 
significantly observed as a net lender or net borrower. Second, and more interestingly, it 
is seen that although home agent becomes eligible to buy foreign security in mildly 
segmented market, the fraction of foreign security the home agent is willing to buy is 
consistently very small. This implies that a model with exchange rate risk might be able 
to explain the well-known "home bias" puzzle. 
The welfare comparison across market structures shows us that they practically 
remain the same on integration. Measurement parameters of welfare changes, δk,l, are not 
small. But, their standard deviations are so large that all δk,l parameters are statistically 
not different than zero. These results are consistent with the expectation that was 
established in the beginning of this chapter. Obviously, terms of trade shock absorbing 
effect dominates the other two effects: diversification and consumption smoothing. Since 
the shocks are already absorbed through the fluctuations in terms of trade the agents are 
indifferent to the market structure selection in terms of diversification benefits. 
Consumption smoothing effect do not play any role here either, since interest rates do not 
change significantly on integration due to very small , if any, diversification benefits.  
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If elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods, θ, were equal to 
infinity then home and foreign goods would be perfect substitutes to each other. This 
implies that terms of trade fluctuations no longer are the shock absorbers in the economy. 
Thus, the analysis are repeated in case 1 where the θ is calibrated to be equal to 1000 
rather than 1.1 as in benchmark case. Table 4.2 presents the results of this case. The 
results are basically the same with the benchmark case. The change in interest rates, 
security prices and welfare on integration is not significantly different than zero. Home 
agent still does buy a very small amount of foreign stock in mildly segmented market.  
Since the empirical literature shows that the plausible values for θ is in the range of 0.1-5, 
it is concluded that welfare changes would be robust to the changes in θ in this study.  
Three more cases are examined to check if the results are robust to the other 
calibration implemented in the study. According to that, a case where the discount rate of 
foreign agent (0.78) is different than that of home agent (0.98) (case II), a case where the 
taste of the agent assumed to be 0.1 instead of 0.8 like in benchmark case (case III), and a 
case where the initial wealths of countries are set to be different (case IV) are analyzed. 
Tables 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5 show the results for case II, case III and case IV respectively. 
They show that the results are robust to these calibration changes, too. Indeed, if all 
uncertainty is absorbed through the changes in the terms of trade, the modifications that 
would only affect the distribution of the uncertainty among the agents should not change 
the fact that the agents are indifferent to the market structure in such an environment.  
In summary, welfare analysis results satisfy the expectations of the model. It is found 
that terms of trade shock absorbing effect is a dominant effect over the other two 
important effects, diversification and consumption smoothing effects, when welfare 
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changes across market structures is examined. Contrary to the previous literature it is 
found that neither interest rates nor security prices change significantly on integration. 
Moreover, it looks like the model with exchange rate is capable of explaining the home-
bias puzzle.  
 
 
4.4 Conclusions 
 
The main result obtained in this chapter is that in an environment where the output 
shocks are absorbed by the fluctuations in the terms of trade the agents would be 
indifferent to the market structure selection, i.e., their welfare would not be affected by 
the level of integration in the financial markets. Thus, the results are consistent with the 
study by Cole and Obstfeld(1991) and extends the validity of their results to a more 
general setting.  
It has also been shown that these results are robust to the changes in the calibration of 
the model. Even for the case where the goods are very close to be perfect substitutes, thus 
the shock absorbing effect of terms of trade is diminished compared to the benchmark 
case, the changes in the welfare of the countries are not significantly different from zero. 
The similar results are obtained when the discount rate is calibrated as different for each 
country's agent, when the taste of the agents is modified, or when the initial wealths of 
countries are set to be different. 
Numerical results also shows that the change in the interest rates and security prices, 
contrary to the previous literature, is not significantly different than zero on integration. 
Here, it should be emphasized here that this does not mean that the prices or interest rates 
do not change on integration. The results are the averages of 100 runs of 50-year 
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economies. Thus, for any single run, the prices or interest rates would be increasing, 
decreasing or not changing on integration. This change would depend on the net effect of 
a number of correlations between returns, and returns and specially designed inflation 
indices. The numerical results show that on average the change in the prices or interest 
rate is equal to zero.  
Finally, it is found that the amount of investment in foreign stock by home agent in 
mildly segmented market is consistently small. This is due to the fact that there is not 
much to gain from diversifying the wealth over the foreign stock since the all uncertainty 
is already absorbed through the terms of trade. Thus, for this model with terms of trade 
shock absorbing effects , home-bias is not a puzzle. 
As a final note, it should be emphasized that all these results have been derived under 
a very special model, so strong conclusions cannot be drawn from these simulations. 
Especially given the fact that the terms of trade (real exchange rate) only absorbs the 
fluctuations in outputs of the countries, any additional uncertainty can increase the 
benefits from diversification. For example, if security prices were not perfectly positively 
correlated with related national outputs one could easily expect higher risk sharing gains 
on integration. 
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Table 4.1: Wealth comparison across market structures with benchmark case.  
 
The values given are the averages of 100 independent histories. Standard deviations are given in 
parentheses. 
 
FINANCIAL 
STRUCTURE 
ASSET PRICE 
 
REAL 
RISK-FREE 
RATE 
PORTFOLIO 
WEIGHTS 
 
WELFARE 
VALUE 
           WELFARE 
CHANGE 
(δk,l) 
 
Segmented 
Market (s) 
PH = 3.60 
(2.11) 
PF = 3.78 
(1.81) 
R=0.1451 
(0.03) 
 
αH = 1 (0.0),  α*H = 0 (0.0)    
αF = 0 (0.0),   α*F = 1 (0.0) 
qH = 0.79,      q*H = -0.79  
     (3.91)               (3.91)    
qF = -0.81,    q*F =0.81 
      (3.88)           (3.88)         
 
VH=-181.21 
(1.24) 
VF = -181.40 
(1.12) 
 
 
Mildly 
Segmented 
Market (m) 
PH = 3.47 
(1.80) 
PF = 3.99 
         (1.66) 
R=0.1457 
(0.03) 
 
αH = 1 (0.0),  α*H = 0 (0.0)    
αF = 0.02 (0.03),    
α*F = 0.98 (0.03) 
qH = 0.54,      q*H = -0.54  
        (4.0)                (4.0)    
qF = -0.57,       q*F =0.57 
      (4.04)            (4.04)        
 
VH=-181.05 
(1.05) 
VF=-181.57 
(0.98) 
 
δs,m(H) =0.01 
(0.04) 
δs,m (F)=-0.009 
(0.01) 
 
 
Integrated 
Market (i) 
PH = 3.99 
(1.78) 
PF = 3.97 
         (1.65) 
R=0.1502 
(0.03) 
 
αH  = 0.5 (0.0),  
α*H = 0.5 (0.0)  
αF = 0.5 (0.0),    
α*F = 0.5 (0.0) 
qH = 0 (0.0),  q*H = 0 (0.0)  
qF = 0 (0.0),   q*F =0 (0.0) 
VH=-181.43 
(0.97) 
VF=-181.43 
(0.97) 
δs,i (H)=-0.012 
(0.04) 
δs,i(F) =0.0000069 
(0.06) 
δm,i (H)=-0.02 
(0.02) 
δm,i(F) =0.009 
(0.009) 
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Table 4.2: Wealth comparison across market structures whenθ=1000 .  
 
The values given are the averages of 100 independent histories. Standard deviations are given in 
parentheses. 
 
FINANCIAL 
STRUCTURE 
ASSET PRICE 
 
REAL 
RISK-FREE 
RATE 
PORTFOLIO 
WEIGHTS 
 
WELFARE 
VALUE 
           WELFARE 
CHANGE 
(δk,l) 
 
Segmented 
Market (s) 
PH = 4.16 
(2.13) 
PF = 3.57 
(1.68) 
R=0.1447 
(0.03) 
 
αH = 1 (0.0),  α*H = 0 (0.0)    
αF = 0 (0.0),   α*F = 1 (0.0) 
qH =-70.55,      q*H = 70.55  
     (243.33)          (243.33)   
qF = 70.58,    q*F =-70.58 
     (243.36)           (243.36)   
 
VH=-181.69 
(1.21) 
VF = -181.60 
(1.09) 
 
 
Mildly 
Segmented 
Market (m) 
PH = 3.79 
(1.81) 
PF = 4.03 
         (1.49) 
R=0.1465 
(0.03) 
 
αH = 1 (0.0),  α*H = 0 (0.0)    
αF = 0.03 (0.03),    
α*F = 0.97 (0.03) 
qH = -59.66,      q*H = 59.66  
     (201.58)          (201.58)   
qF = 59.68,       q*F =-51.68 
    (201.60)          (201.60)     
 
VH=-181.31 
(1.00) 
VF=-181.87 
(0.93) 
 
δs,m(H) =0.03 
(0.04) 
δs,m (F)=-0.02 
(0.06) 
 
 
 
Integrated 
Market (i) 
PH = 4.35 
(1.76) 
PF = 4.02 
         (1.49) 
R=0.1512 
(0.03) 
 
αH  = 0.5 (0.0),  
α*H = 0.5 (0.0)  
αF = 0.5 (0.0),    
α*F = 0.5 (0.0) 
qH = 0 (0.0),  q*H = 0 (0.0)  
qF = 0 (0.0),   q*F =0 (0.0) 
 
VH=-181.71 
(0.93) 
VF=-181.71 
(0.93) 
δs,i (H)=0.0009 
(0.04) 
δs,i(F) =-0.005 
(0.06) 
δm,i (H)=-0.03 
(0.02) 
δm,i(F) =0.01 
(0.01) 
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Table 4.3: Wealth comparison across market structures when discount rate of  foreign 
agent is different than that of home agent. 
  
The values given are the averages of 100 independent histories. Standard deviations are given in 
parentheses. 
 
FINANCIAL 
STRUCTURE 
ASSET PRICE 
 
REAL 
RISK-FREE 
RATE 
PORTFOLIO 
WEIGHTS 
 
WELFARE 
VALUE 
           WELFARE 
CHANGE 
(δk,l) 
 
Segmented 
Market (s) 
PH = 3.62 
(2.00) 
PF = 3.39 
(2.00) 
R=0.2891 
(0.03) 
 
αH = 1 (0.0),  α*H = 0 (0.0)    
αF = 0 (0.0),   α*F = 1 (0.0) 
qH =0.76,      q*H = -0.76  
     (3.92)               (3.92)    
qF = -0.59,    q*F =0.59 
      (3.78)           (3.78)         
 
VH=-181.19 
(1.3) 
VF = -163.73 
(1.5) 
 
 
Mildly 
Segmented 
Market (m) 
PH = 3.00 
(1.61) 
PF = 3.94 
         (1.82) 
R=0.2910 
(0.03) 
 
αH = 1 (0.0),  α*H = 0 (0.0)    
αF = 0.05 (0.04),    
α*F = 0.95 (0.04) 
qH = 0.47,      q*H = -0.47  
        (4.6)                (4.6)    
qF = -0.21,       q*F =0.21 
      (4.51)            (4.51)        
 
VH=-180.56 
(1.02) 
VF=-164.01 
(0.93) 
 
δs,m(H) =0.04 
(0.04) 
δs,m (F)=-0.01 
(0.11) 
 
 
 
Integrated 
Market (i) 
PH = 3.67 
(1.49) 
PF = 3.93 
         (1.81) 
R=0.2954 
(0.03) 
 
αH  = 0.5 (0.0),  
α*H = 0.5 (0.0)  
αF = 0.5 (0.0),    
α*F = 0.5 (0.0) 
qH = 0 (0.0),  q*H = 0 (0.0)  
qF = 0 (0.0),   q*F =0 (0.0) 
 
VH=-181.01 
(0.86) 
VF=-163.84 
(0.89) 
δs,i (H)=0.01 
(0.05) 
δs,i(F) =0.003 
(0.12) 
δm,i (H)=-0.03 
(0.03) 
δm,i(F) =0.01 
(0.01) 
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Table 4.4: Comparison across market structures when ϖ=0.1.  
 
The values given are the averages of 100 independent histories. Standard deviations are given in 
parentheses. 
 
FINANCIAL 
STRUCTURE 
ASSET PRICE 
 
REAL 
RISK-FREE 
RATE 
PORTFOLIO 
WEIGHTS 
 
WELFARE 
VALUE 
           WELFARE 
CHANGE 
(δk,l) 
 
Segmented 
Market (s) 
PH = 3.95 
(1.99) 
PF = 3.64 
(1.66) 
R=0.1462 
(0.03) 
 
αH = 1 (0.0),  α*H = 0 (0.0)    
αF = 0 (0.0),   α*F = 1 (0.0) 
qH = 1.41,      q*H = -1.41  
     (3.71)               (3.71)    
qF = -1.47,    q*F =1.47 
      (3.73)           (3.73)         
 
VH=-181.43 
(1.25) 
VF = -181.36 
(1.08) 
 
 
Mildly 
Segmented 
Market (m) 
PH = 3.74 
(1.69) 
PF = 3.93 
         (1.54) 
R=0.1465 
(0.03) 
 
αH = 1 (0.0),  α*H = 0 (0.0)    
αF = 0.02 (0.03),    
α*F = 0.98 (0.03) 
qH = 1.23,      q*H = -1.23  
        (3.95)                (3.95)   
qF = -1.27,       q*F =1.27 
      (4.02)            (4.02)        
VH=-181.20 
(1.02) 
VF=-181.67 
(1.00) 
δs,m(H) =0.02 
(0.04) 
δs,m (F)=-0.02 
(0.05) 
 
 
 
Integrated 
Market (i) 
PH = 4.21 
(1.70) 
PF = 3.91 
         (1.54) 
R=0.1506 
(0.03) 
 
αH  = 0.5 (0.0),  
α*H = 0.5 (0.0)  
αF = 0.5 (0.0),    
α*F = 0.5 (0.0) 
qH = 0 (0.0),  q*H = 0 (0.0)  
qF = 0 (0.0),   q*F =0 (0.0) 
 
VH=-181.54 
(0.99) 
VF=-181.54 
(0.99) 
δs,i (H)=-0.01 
(0.03) 
δs,i(F) =-0.01 
(0.05) 
δm,i (H)=-0.02 
(0.02) 
δm,i(F) =0.01 
(0.01) 
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Table 4.5: Wealth comparison across market structures when initial wealths of 
countries are different.  
 
The values given are the averages of 100 independent histories. Standard deviations are given in 
parentheses. 
 
FINANCIAL 
STRUCTURE 
ASSET PRICE 
 
REAL 
RISK-FREE 
RATE 
PORTFOLIO 
WEIGHTS 
 
WELFARE 
VALUE 
           WELFARE 
CHANGE 
(δk,l) 
 
Segmented 
Market (s) 
PH = 3.96 
(2.51) 
PF = 2.53 
(1.06) 
R=0.1343 
(0.02) 
 
αH = 1 (0.0),  α*H = 0 (0.0)    
αF = 0 (0.0),   α*F = 1 (0.0) 
qH = 1.07,      q*H = -1.07  
     (4.28)               (4.28)    
qF = -1.13,    q*F =1.13 
      (4.30)           (4.30)         
 
VH=-179.16 
(1.51) 
VF = -183.43 
(1.05) 
 
 
Mildly 
Segmented 
Market (m) 
PH = 3.43 
(1.99) 
PF = 3.18 
         (1.17) 
R=0.1357 
(0.02) 
 
αH = 1 (0.0),  α*H = 0 (0.0)    
αF = 0.04 (0.04),    
α*F = 0.96 (0.04) 
qH = 0.63,      q*H = -0.63  
        (4.20)          (4.20)    
qF = -0.64,       q*F =0.64 
      (4.24)            (4.24)        
 
VH=-178.63 
(1.13) 
VF=-183.99 
(1.13) 
 
δs,m(H) =0.03 
(0.04) 
δs,m (F)=-0.04 
(0.06) 
 
 
 
Integrated 
Market (i) 
PH = 3.94 
(2.00) 
PF = 3.16 
         (1.16) 
R=0.1402 
(0.025) 
 
αH  = 0.515 (0.084),  
α*H = 0.485 (0.084)  
αF = 0.498 (0.085),    
α*F = 0.502 (0.085) 
qH = -0.33 (0.98) 
q*H = 0.33 (0.98)  
qF = 0.38 (0.99) 
q*F =-0.38 (0.99) 
 
VH=-178.99 
(1.06) 
VF=-183.86 
(1.12) 
δs,i (H)=0.01 
(0.04) 
δs,i(F) =-0.03 
(0.06) 
δm,i (H)=-0.02 
(0.02) 
δm,i(F) =0.01 
(0.01) 
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Chapter 5 
 
 
Empirical Tests 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
 
Most empirical studies on international asset pricing models have simply extended the 
classic version of the CAPM to an international framework, thus omitting the currency 
risk as an additional pricing factor. These models basically used a world market risk 
instead of national market risk to model asset pricing in international context. Some of 
these studies (Solnik(1974a), Stehle (1977), Korajczyk and Viallet(1989)) were based on 
the unconditional version of the international asset-pricing model. Thus they were also 
ignoring the conditioning information that becomes periodically available to investors. 
Most of the other studies (as an incomplete list, Harvey(1991), Bekaert and 
Harvey(1995)) which filled this gap by testing a conditional version of international 
CAPM still neglected the exchange rate risk. On the other hand starting with Dumas and 
Solnik (1995) and Santis and Gerard (1998), the conditional version of international asset 
pricing where exchange rate risk is incorporated as an additional pricing factor has been 
analyzed. These two studies provided evidence for the existence of currency risk premia. 
Santis and Gerard also showed that to detect the presence of market risk or exchange rate 
risk a model where both the risks and risks' prices vary through time should be used. 
This chapter attempts to test the conditional version of the international asset-pricing 
model proposed in chapter three of the thesis by using a parsimonious multivariate 
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GARCH process. The theoretical model, consistent with the findings of Santis and 
Gerard (1998), predicts time varying risk prices. This time varying characteristic of the 
risks are analyzed by testing the model on both full-sample and sub-samples basis. To 
decide where the structural breaks occur (where the parameters' structure changes) the 
procedures known as the cusum squares test, Quandt's log-likelihood ratio test, and the 
Chow test (Brown et al. (1975), Harvey (1981)) are utilized. These procedures confirm 
that parameters are not constant over time. The results from both full and sub-samples 
regressions provide evidence for the existence of exchange rate risks, thus partially 
support the theory. However, exchange rate risks' premia are found considerably smaller 
than that of market risk. In addition, the restrictions predicted by the models are not 
achieved and the adjusted R2s are not high.  
The structure of this chapter is as follows. The next section provides the return 
relations that are going to be tested. Third section presents the data and its simple 
statistics. The methodology used to test the relations is explained in section four.  Section 
five analyzes the structural breaks occurred over the sample period. Section six examines 
the preliminary results. Finally, section seven concludes the chapter. 
 
5.2 Security Return Relations 
 
To test the model with real exchange rate, first the equations that define security prices 
are converted to the ones that define returns. Since Case I is a more realistic model than 
Case II, only the equations from Case I3 are tested. Unfortunately, since mildly 
segmented model is a very complicated model, it has been neglected. Thus the models for  
                                                           
3 Please refer to the Chapter 3 for the definitions of the model. 
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which empirical evidence is searched are the ones for integrated market and segmented 
market structures.  In the integrated market the following relation gives real return of the 
security: 
 
where Ri  is real return of the security, Ii is a specially designed inflation index of country 
i, RM is real return of market portfolio. The theory predicts the following restrictions 
related to the parameters; 
b0=0,  b1i>0, b2i<0, and b3 >0.  
Thus, the equation above tells us that the return of a security in integrated markets is 
positively correlated to 1) its covariance with market portfolio, and to 2) the expected 
value of inverse-inflation index and negatively correlated to the 3) covariance of market 
return with inverse of inflation index. The second (expected value of inverse-inflation 
index ) and third variable (covariance of market return with inverse of inflation index) are 
going to be called as "exchange rate risks" from now on since these are the additional 
variables to the classic CAPM due to uncertainty related to the real exchange rate. The 
theory also predicts that the prices of each source of exchange rate risks vary from one 
country to the other while the price of market risk is common across all countries. 
In segmented market the real return of the security is defined as follows: 
 
where I
j is the inflation index of country j. In the simplified model, that is two-country 
environment, it was the inflation index of foreign country. In real data, that is a multi-
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country environment, it is going to be defined as the weighted inflation index of the 
leading markets to the particular country i whose national equity index is the dependent 
variable in the regression.  
This relation above shows us that the security return of a particular country in segmented 
market is related to its 1) variance, 2) covariance with the inverse of the country’s 
inflation index, and 3) covariance with a weighted average of inverse-inflation indices of 
the country’s leading markets. These last two terms also enter to the formula in their 
second moments and as an interaction term. In segmented market case, all variables 
except the variance of the return are related to uncertainty of the real exchange rate, thus 
can be called as "exchange rate risks". The theory also predicts the following restrictions 
related to the parameters; 
b0i >0,  b1i >0,  b3i >0 and b4i >0. 
The signs of the other variables are ambiguous. 
  
 5.3 Sample And Simple Statistics 
 
The sample consists of monthly returns on stock indices for eight countries plus a 
value-weighted world index. The sample period covers from December 1973-December 
1998. The indexes are obtained from DataStream. DataStream database contains indexes 
for 35 financial markets plus several regional indices.  For the analysis here, the G7 
countries (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, and United States) 
and Switzerland, the largest European market not included in the G7 are selected. 
National stock indices are defined in their own national currencies. Value weighted world 
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index is obtained by converting individual market data to a common currency of U.S. 
dollars. 
The related monthly exchange rates and consumer price indices have been obtained 
from International Financial Statistics (IFS) database. The exchange rates are defined as 
national currency per U.S. dollar. Finally, the leading markets to each country have been 
obtained from International Trade Statistics Yearbook. This yearbook, for each country, 
gives the percent of trade accounted for by each of the first ten trading partners. The 
leading markets for each country are chosen as the most important ones (with a percent of 
trade equal to or higher than 10%) among these trading partners.  
Table 5.1 Panel A contains the summary statistics for the data. In all cases, index of 
skewness and index of kurtosis strongly reject the hypothesis of normally distributed 
returns. The index of kurtosis is particularly large for U.K. Panel A also contains the 
unconditional correlations among markets. The values in most cases are below 0.6. The 
correlation between U.S. and Canada, not surprisingly, is rather high compared to the 
other correlations, 0.74. The other correlations higher than 0.6 are the ones between 
Switzerland and U.S., Germany and U.K., and U.S. and U.K. 
Panel B in the table reports autocorrelations for the returns and the returns squared. 
Since the autocorrelations of the stock returns are not predominantly significant, the 
analysis does not need to be corrected for spurious autocorrelation in the market indices. 
On the other hand, in most cases, significant autocorrelation is detected in short lags for 
the squared returns. This implies that a GARCH parameterization for the second 
moments would be appropriate for the stock returns. 
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Finally, for the squared returns, Panel B presents the cross correlations between the 
world index and the other assets. It is observed that the squared world index return is 
consistently correlated with the other squared asset returns at lead 1. The analysis of other 
cross correlations among squared returns (not reported) reveals that, with a few 
exceptions, all cross correlations are contemporaneously correlated. 
The series (stock prices, stock returns, consumer price indices and inflations) are also 
tested for their stationary characteristics by using Dickey-Fuller unit root tests. Since the 
number of observations is equal to 310, the critical value of the test for case without trend 
is -14.0 and approximately -20.3 at 0.05 and 0.01 significance levels, respectively. For 
the test with trend it is equal to approximately -21.3, and -28.4 at 0.05 and 0.01 
significance levels respectively. It is seen in Panel C that in most cases the null 
hypothesis that the series has unit root cannot be rejected for the levels of series (security 
price levels and consumer price indices). However, the null is consistently rejected for 
their first difference (stock returns and inverse of inflations). This implies that stock 
returns and inverse of inflations are stationary.  
 
5.4 Methodology 
 
 
For the estimation of security return relations in section 5.2, a conditional version of 
international asset pricing model is used. In literature, GARCH (1,1) processes have been 
popularly used to estimate the conditional versions of asset pricing. With GARCH (1,1) 
parameterization, the equations systems that are going to be tested in integrated market 
would be formalized as follows: 
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where C is a (NxN) symmetric matrix and A and B are (NxN) matrices of constant 
coefficients and N is number of risky securities. The system in segmented market would 
be formalized similarly. The representation of the first term in the second equation of the 
system guarantees Ht to be positive definite (Baba et al. (1989) and Engle and Kroner 
(1995)). The full parameterization of this system necessitates the estimation of 
(2xNxN)+N(N+1)/2 parameters. To make the estimation achievable, often, either the 
correlations are restricted to be constant (Bollerslev (1990) and Ng (1991)) or both A and 
B are restricted to be diagonal matrices (Bollerslev, Engle, and Wooldridge (1988)). The 
diagonal matrix parameterization implies that the variances in Ht depend only on past 
squared residuals and an autoregressive component, while the covariances depend upon 
past cross products of residuals and an autoregressive component. If cross-market 
dependencies exist as documented by Hamao, Masulis, and Ng (1990) and Chan, Karolyi, 
and Stulz (1992) by using high frequency data, then this diagonal parameterization may 
be quite restrictive.  
To test the return relations, a full parameterization of GARCH (1,1) process is 
implemented in this chapter. To make the analysis numerically tractable, the parameters 
are estimated for each security return separately. This implies, for the model tested here, 
using of a trivariate GARCH (1,1) process in both integrated and segmented market 
cases. In integrated market case the risky securities are world market return, national 
index return and inverse of national inflation index, thus N is equal to three. In segmented 
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market case risky securities are national index return, inverse of national inflation 
index, and inverse of foreign inflation index, thus still N is equal to three.  Moreover, a 
two-stage estimation methodology is applied to estimate the parameters rather than 
estimating a simultaneous system. First, time varying risk measures using GARCH (1,1) 
representation are generated; next these generated time-varying risk measures are used as 
explanatory variables in simple regressions for the relevant particular stock return. Pagan 
(1984) examines the consistency and asymptotic distribution of using this two-stage 
approach and reports that as long as the first stage produces consistent estimates of time 
varying risks, the second stage will also produce consistent estimates.   
The first-stage estimation is implemented by using maximum likelihood estimation 
techniques. Under the assumption of conditional normality, the log-likelihood function 
can be written as follows: 
 
 
where θ is the vector of unknown parameters in the model. However, since it was already 
mentioned in previous section that normality assumption is violated in the sample, which 
is often the case in financial time series, the quasi-maximum likelihood (QML) approach 
proposed by Bollerslev and Wooldridge (1992) is used to estimate the model. The QML 
estimator is consistent and asymptotically normal under fairly weak conditions. Non-
linear optimization is performed by using Broyden, Fletcher, Goldfard, and Shanno 
(BFGS) algorithm. 
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In the second stage, first the constancy of the regression parameters over time 
(model stability)  is examined by utilizing the cusum squares tests, Quandt's log-
likelihood test, and the Chow test. Cusum squares test developed by Brown, Durbin, and 
Evans (1975) is an appropriate test for time-series data especially when one is not sure 
when a structural change might have occurred in time. The null hypothesis is that the 
coefficient vector is the same in every period; the alternative is that it (or the disturbance 
variance) is not. This test uses squares of recursive residuals,w2r , and is based on the plot 
of the quantities 
 
against r for r=k+1,……T where k is the number of explanatory variables in the 
regression model, and T is the total number of observations. sr is the ratio of sum of 
squared recursive residuals up to time r to the sum of  squared recursive residuals over 
the whole period. Under the null, sr may be shown to have a beta distribution with mean 
of (t-k)/ (T-k). This suggests drawing a pair of lines 
parallel to the mean value line, E(sr) , and rejecting the null hypothesis if either of the 
lines is crossed. c0 depends on both (T-K) and the significance level desired. Tables may 
be found in Harvey (1990) and Johnston (1984).  
As a complement to the cusum squares test, Quandt's log-likelihood ratio technique, 
described in two papers by Quandt (1958, 1960),  is employed. The null hypothesis is that 
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the observations in the time segments (1,….r) and (1+r,…..T) come from the same 
regression; the alternative is that they come from two different regressions. The Quandt's 
log-likelihood ratio can be calculated as 
 
 where σ12, σ22 and σ2 are the ratios of the residual sums of squares to number of 
observations when the regression is fitted to the first r observations, the remaining T-r 
observations and the entire set of T observations, respectively. The estimate of the point 
at which the structural change occurred is the value of r at which λr attains its minimum. 
Since the distribution of λr under the null hypothesis is not known, there is not a test 
developed for its minimum. However, Quandt's log likelihood ratio is just used as a 
complement to cusum squares test. Moreover, once the structural breaks points are 
estimated by these two methods, Chow test can be applied to re-test the existence of 
structural change in the regression parameters at these estimated break points. Chow test 
is a more powerful test than the cusum squares test.  However, it is a specific test in the 
sense that one has to know at which point the structural break occurred to implement that 
test. The Chow test statistics has an F-distribution and is given by 
 
where SSE1, SSE2, and SSET are the residual sums of squares from the regression on the 
first r observations, the remaining T-r observations, and the entire T observations 
respectively. The null hypothesis is  that there is no structural change at r. 
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Once the structural change points in time are determined for each G7 country, as 
the next step in the second stage, security return relations for both integrated and 
segmented market cases are estimated by implementing simple regressions for both full 
period and sub-periods. In these regressions, t-statistics are calculated by using the 
procedures suggested by Newey and West (1987) for correction of the heteroskedacticity 
related to the dependent variables. Finally, two models, integrated market model and 
segmented market model, are compared in terms of their explanatory power for security 
returns. Since the models are not nested, J-test proposed by Davidson and MacKinnon 
(1981) is used for that purpose.  
Basically, Davidson and MacKinnon's J test consists of estimating parameters by a 
least squares regression for one model (say integrated market case) and then regressing 
the dependent variable (security return) on the regressors of the other model (say 
segmented market regressors) and the fitted values of dependent variable from the first 
model. An asymptotically valid test would be to test if the coefficient on the fitted value 
in this final regression is significantly different than zero or not to determine if the first 
model has some explanatory power over the second model. Obviously the test can be 
implemented the other way around and the power of second model over the first one can 
also be tested. In this study, both ways have been exploited to determine which model, 
integrated market model or segmented market model, has more explanatory power. 
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5.5 Structural Break Points 
 
Break points have been determined by using the information obtained from cusum 
squares test, sr , and Quandt's log likelihood ratio, λr for each country separately. Table 
5.2 reports the structural break points implied by cusum squares test, sr , and Quandt's log 
likelihood ratio, λr , and the related Chow statistics4 for these break points. Chow tests are 
consistently significant at 1% level indicating that the model changes its structure by 
moving from pre-break point period to post-break point period.  
It is possible to come up with some satisfactory economic explanations for these 
statistical break points. They roughly overlaps with the institutional exchange regime 
change periods for each country. The first break points, overall, are spread over an eight-
year span. However, this eight-year period can be considered as a transitory period after 
the break-down of Bretton Woods Agreement: the transition from fixed exchange rate 
regimes to dirty floating exchange regimes. For example, for Japan, 1979 is the year 
when restrictions on capital inflows began to be loosened and December 1, 1980 is the 
date when exchange controls have been abolished by Foreign Exchange and Trade 
Control Law. Since the breakdown of Bretton Woods Agreement European countries 
continued the joint float of their respective currencies. Finally, in March 13, 1979 
European Monetary System (EMS) was established. Moreover, Germany relaxed 
exchange controls related to the purchase of German securities by non-residents during 
1980s. In the case of Switzerland, Swiss franc denominated securities have been available 
                                                           
 
4 Brown, Durbin, and Evans treat the cusum squares test as suggestive of structural change rather than a 
formal test of parameter stability. On the other there is no test developed for Quandt's log likelihood ratio. 
Moreover, Chow test is a more powerful test than sr. For all these reasons, Chow test is used as a final 
decision maker here. 
  
78
 
to non-residents and the requirement that foreigners' subscriptions to any issue of 
foreign bonds denominated in Swiss franc could not exceed 50% was abolished starting 
from  24 January 1979. France and Italy have experienced their exchange regime 
liberalization in mid-1980s (Chelley-Steeley, Steeley, and Pentecost (1998)).  
In summary, the global liberalization programs have continuously reduced the 
exchange controls since the break-down of Bretton Woods. Since the markets have 
opened up, they also became more integrated than they were in the past. Because of this 
integration effect, the second and third break points, if any,  are observed to be very close 
to each other for all countries. The second break point captures the famous Black 
Monday (19 October 1987) effect on the markets.  Only for Japan and Italy, it seems like 
the structural change occurred before the other markets. This may be due to the fact that 
although all countries were experiencing a gradual liberalization in their exchange 
regimes,  these two countries' liberalization had been slower than the others and they 
have experienced very important changes just before the crash. In September 22, 1985, 
the Group Five  (France, the federal Republic of Germany, Japan, United Kingdom and 
United States) declared that  
"exchange rates did not fully reflect fundamental economic conditions , that further measures aimed at 
opening markets would be important in resisting protectionism, and that the members of the Group Five 
agreed that some further orderly appreciation of the main non-dollar currencies against the US dollar would 
be desirable, and expressed their readiness to cooperate more closely to encourage such a development 
when to do so would be helpful ( IMF-Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange 
Restrictions 1985)". 
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Thus, Italy and especially Japan, might have experienced a change in the pace of 
opening their financial markets just before the crash and entered a structural change 
before any other country. 
  The liberalization of the financial markets made the EMS extremely vulnerable to 
speculation. This has led to the successful speculative attacks on almost all participating 
currencies (especially the Italian lira and the British pound), thus led to the collapse of the 
system in August 1993. In September 16, 1992 United Kingdom has suspended the 
intervention obligations with respect to exchange and the intervention mechanism of the 
EMS. In September 17, 1992 the Italy temporarily withdrew from the exchange rate and 
the intervention mechanism of the EMS, and the lira was allowed to float. In 1993, the 
relatively small fluctuation margins of ± 2.25% for the bilateral rates were enlarged to 
15% for all countries in EMS, except for the Dutch guilder/Deutschmark (DM) rate. 
United States and Japan has continued to liberalize their financial markets. In Japan, the 
system of foreign deposit accounts was liberalized on July 30, 1990. In United States, the 
Federal Reserve Board's decision (of December 23, 1988) allowing U.S. banks to accept 
foreign currency deposits became effective on December 31, 1989. The third break point 
reflects all these dramatic changes in the economies of countries. 
 
5.6 Empirical Evidence on International Asset Pricing Models 
 
The models for integrated and segmented market cases are tested and compared for 
both entire period and the specific sub periods for each country.  The objective of these 
tests are two-fold; the first one is to examine whether the exchange rate variables are 
significant in explaining the asset pricing relations regardless of the models and the 
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second one is to examine which model is a better one in explaining the security pricing 
relations.  
Panel A in Table 5.3 presents the point estimates of the coefficients and t-statistics 
computed using robust standard errors of the integrated market model for the entire 
period. Unfortunately, none of the explanatory variables are significant consistently for 
all countries.  The point estimates of the market risk are significant in five cases, while 
the point estimates of the exchange rate risks are significant only in five cases, in total. 
However, the more unfortunate fact is that the sings of the regressors are mixed, thus 
neither in conflict nor in consistency with the theory. The classic CAPM and the asset 
pricing model with exchange rate here (Exchange Rate CAPM, ER-CAPM from now on) 
predicts a positive coefficient for the market risk. From the table, the market premium is 
statistically negative for two out of five cases where it is significant. ER-CAPM also 
predicts positive premium for covariance of the market return with the inverse-inflation 
index (inflation-market risk) and negative premium for expected value of the inverse-
inflation (inflation risk). However, market-inflation risk premium is negative in one out 
of two significant cases and inflation risk premium is positive in one out of three 
significant cases. Moreover, the constant term, which is predicted to be equal to zero by 
both classic CAPM and ER-CAPM, is significant in five out of eight cases. Thus, the 
integrated market results for the entire period provide support for neither of the theories.  
As mentioned before, to capture, at least partially, the time varying characteristics of 
the risk premiums, integrated market model is analyzed for the sub-periods for each of 
which it has been determined that regression relation changes its structure. Panel B in 
Table 5.3 reports the estimation results from this analysis. The results are both different 
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and not different from the results for the entire period. They are different because now 
the number of times the exchange rate risks are significant much larger than the number 
times they were in the full period. Market-inflation risk is significant for 12, inflation risk 
is significant for 16, and market risk is significant for 15 cases out of 30 cases. These 
numbers are not large enough to claim that these variables are priced in asset pricing 
relations. However, they are also too large to attribute them the randomness. The sub 
period results are not different from entire period results because the flaw that the signs 
of the coefficients are not consistent with the theory still exists in sub period analysis. 
There are only 4 sub-periods where all three variables are significant: the third sub-period 
for France and the fourth sub-periods for Italy, United Kingdom, and Switzerland. This is 
reasonable since one would expect the level of integration of the markets is increasing in 
time, thus an integrated market model would be more valid for a recent period.     
A number of diagnostic tests on residuals (not reported) are also implemented to test 
the specification of the model. The Durbin-Watson tests for the first order serial 
correlation of the residuals, in most cases, are close to 2. This implies the absence of first 
order serial correlation of the residuals. The Ljung-Box tests for higher order correlation 
of residuals also fail (except three cases) to reject the null that higher order serial 
correlations are different from zero, thus implying that GARCH (1,1) parameterization 
that is adopted here is satisfactory. However, the adjusted R2 s are rather low for most of 
cases. This statistics reaches its highest values of 2.1% and 2.5% for Switzerland and 
Germany respectively for the full period. However, for the first and last sub periods of 
United Kingdom and the last sub period of Switzerland, it improves to be 10%, 10% and 
20% respectively. 
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As a second step to analyze whether the exchange rate risks are important in asset 
pricing or not, the regressions from segmented market are examined. Unfortunately, 
Canada case had to be excluded. There was a two-fold problem that made the would-be 
regression results for Canada unreasonable; the regressors had very small fluctuations, 
basically they were constants, and well-known multicollinearity problem. For 
Switzerland and France, who also suffered from multicollinearity, it was possible to 
obtain some reasonable results by simply ignoring the variables with high collinearity.  
Panel A in Table 5.4 reports the point estimates of the coefficients and t-statistics 
computed using robust standard errors of the segmented market model for the entire 
period. These results are not very much different from those found in integrated market 
model analysis. The signs of the coefficients are mixed. The coefficients are not 
consistently significant for all countries. For two countries (Germany, and United 
Kingdom) none of segmented market model variables is significant in explaining these 
particular countries' equity returns. On the other hand, for United States all segmented 
market model variables are found to be significant. The sub period results do not make 
many changes in these facts. In 11 cases out of 27 cases, at least four of the segmented 
variables are significant. On the other hand, in 5 out of 27 cases, none of them are 
significant.  
Diagnostic tests on residuals for the segmented market model regressions are also 
implemented. Durbin Watson and the Ljung-Box tests (except two cases; first sub-
periods of United States and United Kingdom) imply the absence of any first or higher 
order correlation for both full and sub-period samples. The adjusted R2 s are rather low 
for most of cases. This statistics reaches its highest values of 3.5% and 3.0% for United 
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States and Italy respectively for the full period. However, for the sub-period 
regressions, for some cases it reaches rather large values; it is equal to 19% and 16% for 
the third and fourth sub-periods of France, to 14.5% and 10% for the second and third 
sub-periods of Switzerland, to 28% for the second sub-period for Germany, to 25% for 
the second sub-period of Japan, and to 18% for the third sub-period of United States.  
Towards the objective of comparing two models, J-tests are implemented for both full 
and sub-period samples. Table 5.5 shows the results of these tests. First part (I) of Table 
5.5 reports the regression results when the estimated value of national equity return by 
segmented market model is added as a regressor to the integrated market model. Second 
part (II) of the same table reports the regression results when the estimated value of 
national equity return by integrated market model is added as a regressor to the 
segmented market model. The segmented market model is consistently significant over 
and behind integrated market model for all cases but one (both in full period and sub-
period samples). On the other hand, integrated market model is significant in 3 out of 7 
cases in full period sample and 20 out of 27 cases in sub-period samples over and behind 
segmented market model. Thus, although one can claim that segmented market model is 
better model by looking at these results, a stronger argument would be that both models 
have some explanatory power over each other. Indeed, when the adjusted R2s of four 
class of regressions - Integrated market model (I) regressions, segmented market model, 
(II) regressions, regressions where the regressors are the ones from integrated market 
model plus estimated national equity return by segmented market model (III), regressions 
where the regressors are the ones from segmented market model plus the estimated 
national equity return by the integrated market model (IV) - are compared, it is found that 
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III has the highest adjusted R2s, closely followed by IV. Thus, it is hard to strongly 
claim that one of the models is better than the other.  
To summarize, the results support that exchange rate risk is an important factor in 
determining the risk-return relations. Therefore, the results provide that classic CAPM 
would not be able to fully explain the dynamics of international expected returns. 
However, the results only weakly support either the integrated market model or 
segmented market model proposed by the present study here. Although the pattern of 
significance of the variables could be satisfactory to support the models, the restrictions 
predicted by the models are not achieved and the adjusted R2s are not high enough to 
claim that either of the models can satisfactorily explain the international returns.  
 
5.7 Conclusions 
 
 
The main result of this chapter provides support to the main result of the third 
chapter; the exchange rate is an important pricing factor. This result is consistent with the 
previous studies by Dumas and Solnik (1995) and Santis and Gerard (1997).  The main 
contribution of the present study to these previous studies is in terms of the specification 
of exchange rate risk. Both of these studies considered three sources of exchange risk 
premium; the Deutsche mark, the Japanese yen, and the British pound whose selection 
have been justified by the fact that these markets cover more than 80% of the world 
portfolio. As already pointed out by the authors of these studies, including only three 
sources of currency risk can introduce a potential bias in the estimations of the currency 
risk. On the other hand, the model proposed here itself determines which currencies 
should be included in an empirical test, thus avoids this kind of bias. Along with the lines 
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of the theory, in the empirical tests of each country the real exchange risks of this 
particular country's leading trading partners have been included. Therefore, any bias that 
may occur due to random selection of currency risks have been avoided. Despite this 
specification (in some way limitation) of the currencies, the empirical results provide that 
exchange rate currency is an important factor in the pricing of the securities.   
However, the empirical evidence only weakly support the either of the models 
proposed in this study. It provides some support since the exchange rate risk is priced. 
But, it is only a tentative support since exchange rate is not consistently priced, the 
restrictions predicted by the models are not achieved and the adjusted R2s are not high 
enough to claim that either of the models can satisfactorily explain the international 
returns. Moreover, the significance of the variables depends on the samples used. There 
could be some explanations for these results besides the model misspecification. First, it 
is possible that GARCH model specification of the time varying risks may not be really 
capturing the time series properties of the risks, thus, of the returns. Second, the structural 
break approach may not be rich enough to characterize the time-varying properties of the 
risk premia. Santis and Gerard (1997) have already shown that only with both time-
varying risks and risk-premia the significant results are detected for market risk and 
exchange rate risk. Thus, it is expected that with a model specification where both risks 
and risk premia are time-varying the results would be improved in the favor of the 
models.  
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Chapter 6 
 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
 
In this chapter, the main results of the thesis are summarized and the implications of the 
findings are conjectured. Also, the assumptions of the model are stated and how the 
relaxation of these assumptions might affect the results are discussed. 
In this thesis our objective was to examine the effect of exchange rate risk on 
international asset pricing under varying market structures. The analysis shows that the 
exchange rate risk is one of the important determinants in international asset pricing for 
all market structures. Theoretical exposition in chapter three derives the international 
asset pricing relations for two specific cases: first, for the case where the exchange rate is 
defined as the relative price of foreign good to home good; second, for the case where 
exchange rate is nothing but the foreign good's price level. Therefore, the analysis is 
capable of making direct comparisons with the previous literature. The asset pricing 
relations show in this chapter that exchange rate would be one of the important 
determinants in the pricing equations even if markets are integrated. Chapter four 
examines the welfare changes across market structures in an environment with a real 
exchange rate, which is also equal to the terms of trade. It is found that due to shock 
absorbing effect of exchange rate, risk sharing and consumption smoothing effects on 
integration no longer are effective. Thus the welfare changes on integration are found to 
be not significantly different than zero. Finally, in chapter five the segmented and 
integrated market models are empirically tested to check if the exchange rate is priced 
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and to examine which one of the models would describe the international returns 
better. It is found that exchange rate is an important factor empirically in international 
asset pricing. However, the findings lead to the conclusion that neither of the models can 
satisfactorily explain the international returns.  
There are a couple implications of the findings in the thesis. In chapter three it has 
been shown that exchange rate is important because agents not only consume home 
goods but foreign goods. Thus, the findings imply that a country whose economy is 
solidly based on imported goods but do not export much would be more prone to the 
exchange rate uncertainty. This is valid regardless of the level of market segmentation. 
On the other hand, for countries with similar economies, the results show that there are 
basically two ways for the countries to minimize the exchange rate risk: 1) The country 
totally isolates itself from the outside world, i.e., even the goods markets are segmented. 
This is quite an unrealistic scenario. 2) The country tries to reach a state where markets 
are integrated as much as possible. This induces the incentives for countries to open up 
their markets. However, having countries with similar economies in all respect is not a 
very realistic assumption, either. Thus, implications should be interpreted cautiously. 
Chapter four shows us, under very specific assumptions, that agents would be indifferent 
to the choice of market structure in an environment with exchange rate. Given the fact 
that there are many additional shocks -fiscal, monetary etc.- to productivity shocks in a 
real economy and exchange rate can only absorb the shocks to the production, one should 
not conclude that the choice of market structure does not matter in terms of welfare 
results. Rather an investigation of a more general model is required.  
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The fact that exchange rate risk would affect the real return of a security, which 
was documented in chapter five, means that required return on an equity, thus cost of 
capital of a company, would be also affected by exchange rate risk. In other words, the 
existence of exchange rate risk would also have implications on the riskiness of a firm. 
This produces incentives for firms to merge across countries or simply to hedge their risk 
related to exchange rate by using different hedging techniques. Indeed, a 1998 Wharton 
survey of financial risk management by US non-financial firms shows that the firms are 
already aware of the exchange rate risk they are exposed to. According to this survey, "of 
the firms using derivatives, foreign-exchange risk is the risk most commonly managed 
with derivatives, being done so by 83% of all derivatives users".  
For the sake of simplicity and analytical tractability, a number of key assumptions 
have been made throughout the thesis. Obviously the relaxation of these assumptions 
might change the results. One of the most important assumptions used was the existence 
of Purchasing Power Parity (PPP). If the model were specified in a way that PPP does not 
hold, the pricing equations derived would be even more complicated than they are 
presently. However, the fundamental relations would not change. On the other hand, the 
relaxation of the very same assumption could have a solid change in the results of 
numerical analysis. This is because if the PPP does not hold, this would imply that the 
shock absorbing effect of exchange rate for the productivity shocks would not be one to 
one. Thus, one easily can expect to find that diversification gains increase in such a 
setting.  
The second important modification of the model would be the addition of the 
production side of the economy. However, with such an addition to derive closed-form 
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asset pricing relations would become impossible. Then, one has to move on with the 
numerical examination of the model. Khang Min Lee, in a model where she combines  
the production side of the economy with the consumption side, shows that capital share 
of the production technology is one of the important determinants that would 
dramatically change the welfare results. In the model used here, it is implicitly assumed 
that production exhibits a constant returns to scale which is empirically not supported. 
Thus, it would be interesting to examine the combined effects of changing capital share 
of the production with exchange rate risk. Moreover, by adding the production side of the 
economy one could also compare the impact of exchange rate risk on a firm which could 
have its contracts in its own national currency with a firm which does not have such a 
flexibility.  
The model used in the thesis is a two-period, two-asset, and two-country model. 
Obviously it could be extended to a multi-period or a multi-country or a multi-asset 
setting (or any combination of these). The extension of the model in chapter three to a 
multi-period setting would make the household problem more complicated. In a multi-
period setting, the portfolio choice in each period will depend on the portfolio decisions 
in the previous period.  On the other hand, the extension of the model to a multi-asset 
setting is not expected to change the results at all. Errunza and Losq (1985) and Eun and 
Janakiraman (1986) already derived asset pricing relations in a multi-asset setting and 
mean-variance framework. But, Basak (1996) was able to derive the same risk-return 
relations in a two-asset setting. Unlike the case of multi-asset setting, multi-country 
setting could lead to significant changes in the results. Errunza and Losq (1989) have 
already shown how the asymmetric diversification benefits can be captured in a multi-
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country setting. A multi-country setting would also allow to examine the impact of a 
country's size on the welfare results.  
A representative agent approach has been adopted in this thesis. This was appropriate 
since the objective of numerical analysis was to examine the incremental welfare changes 
of a country as a homogenous entity on integration. However, if one would like to 
examine the effect of financial market structure on the income distribution within a 
country, then the modeling of heterogeneity across households of the same country is 
required. For example, even if the diversification effects are small for the country, it 
could be possible that welfare increase of some individuals in the country is large due to 
the tax differentials. 
When one considers all these extension possibilities of the model, it is obvious that 
the model analyzed here is nothing but a very elementary one. Basically, the model here, 
with the addition of the exchange rate risk to the mean-variance framework, extended the  
current research of market segmentation literature to a little bit more general setting.  It 
hopefully provides some insights on the effects of exchange rate on asset pricing under 
varying market structures. It will expectantly build up the means of moving to even a 
more general, thus realistic, setting for a better understanding of the international asset 
pricing.  
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Appendix  
 
 
 
 
A Derivation of Consumption-Based Price Indices 
 
 
In this section home consumption-based price index is derived under the assumption that 
home representative agent maximizes a constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) function 
of the form  
 
subject to the total expenditure function given as: 
 
Maximizing the function (1A) subject to constraint (2A) yields  
  
showing that consumption preferences are homothetic (relative demand depends only on 
real exchange rate) and that θ (a constant) is the elasticity of substitution between home 
and foreign goods consumed by home agent. By combining equation (3A) with equation 
(2A), the demand functions for foreign and home products of home agent can be 
obtained. 
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The equations in (4A) show the demands that maximize C given spending Z. Thus the 
highest value of the index C, given Z, is found by substituting those demand functions 
into the consumption index given in (1A). 
 
Consumption-based price index, P, is defined to be the minimum expenditure such that 
C=1. 
 
Thus, the solution for P is, 
 
By following similar calculations, foreign consumption-based price index is found to be 
equal to, 
 
Z/P is the ratio of spending, measured in units of home goods, to the minimum price, in 
home goods, of a single unit of the consumption index. Thus Z/P equals to the level of 
the total real consumption index C that an optimizing consumer utilizes. In other words, 
the price index converts the consumption spending measured in home goods into real 
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consumption, C. Obviously, a given expenditure of home goods would yield less real 
consumption of C after a rise in real exchange rate. Price index, P, shows us how much 
the decrease is. Price index also simplifies the demand functions in (4A) as 
 
These simplified demand functions show us that the demand for a good is proportional to 
real consumption. 
 
 
B Distribution of Time-1 Consumption  
 
 
If equations 3.10 and 3.13 are combined, the time-1 consumption value for home agent is 
equal to: 
 
Similarly, when equations 3.12 and 3.14 are combined, the time-1 value for foreign agent 
is found to be: 
 
When Purchasing Power Parity holds (2B) can be written as: 
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 Since time-0 consumption based price indices, portfolio rules and interest rates are 
deterministic at time-0, from equations (1B) and (2B), it is observed that the distributions 
of time-1 consumption of home and foreign agents are same and would depend on the 
distributions of time-1 prices, exchange rate and price indices. Thus, in the rest of the 
Appendix B, only the distribution of time-1 value of the home agent consumption is 
discussed.  
Statistically, the distribution of time-1 value of consumption is not known. However, 
by using numerical analysis  it can be approximated. For that purpose a Monte Carlo 
simulation was implemented. If deterministic terms are separated as coefficients in the 
equation of time-1 consumption –equation (1B)-, then  
 
where all B’s are positive and B3 and B4 should be between 0 and 1 since the number of 
shares are normalized in the model. Exchange rate is the relative price of home good to 
foreign good. It will be characterized as the ratio of home good’s price to foreign good’s 
price in the numerical analysis. Consumption-based price index is a function of exchange 
rate. 
 
All prices –security prices and good prices- are assumed to be normally distributed. 
Following Stapleton and Subrahmanyam (1977) and Eun and Janakiramanan(1986), the 
expected values of prices are set to be equal to 100, standard deviations to range from 10 
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to 30, and correlations across prices to range from 0.1 to 0.9. The weight for the 
amount of home good in total consumption of home agent, ω , would be between 0 and 1. 
Finally, θ, the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods is the most 
uncertain parameter to determine. Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1994) suggest that it 
should be between 1 and 2 for the United States , and even smaller values for Japan and 
an aggregate of European countries. In the present numerical analysis elasticity of 
substitution between home and foreign good is assumed to range between 0.1 and 5. For 
each different combination of the parameters discussed, multivariate normal random 
prices, and a sample of time-1 value of consumption is created in the size of 1000. This 
process is repeated 100 times for the same combination of parameters. For each 
distribution underlying a sample of consumptions, a Wald test related to that distribution 
is calculated5. Wald test is one of the methods used for testing whether the distribution 
underlying the sample is normal or not. Under the null hypothesis of normality, the test 
statistic is equal to: 
  
where  b1 is the skewness of the distribution, b2 is the kurtosis of the distribution and n is 
the number of observations in the sample. Wald tests have been evaluated at 1% critical 
value from the chi-squared table for two degrees of freedom, which is equal to 10.6. For 
each test that is smaller than the critical value, it is concluded that the residuals do not 
                                                           
 
 
5 The MATLAB code that is used for that purpose is given in Appendix D.  
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depart significantly from normality. Last column of Table B16, named as “% of 
normal” shows the percentage of Wald tests that are smaller than the 1% critical value 
among 100 Wald tests calculated for the same calibration . Table B1 also shows the 
calibration for each case. It is seen from this table that if the investment in home security 
and the percentage of home good consumed by home agent are very small, the 
percentages of Wald tests that fail to reject (% of normal) becomes small, too. However, 
small investment and little consumption at home by home agent are not something 
expected in real economy. Home bias is a well-known fact, i.e., consumers would tend to 
consume at home. There are still some problematic cases, for example, in the case where 
segmented market is represented, thus B4 is equal to 0 and B3 is equal to 1, percentage 
significantly drops to 30 %s. When the problematic cases are investigated, it is 
understood that this is due to low correlation between prices of two goods. However, 
these low percentages increase to even %100s once the correlation between prices of 
home good and home security and/or the correlation of prices of foreign good and foreign 
security are relatively higher compared to other correlations. Having relatively higher 
correlations  between these variables is very intuitive. Thus, it is concluded that the 
distribution of time-1 value of consumption can be approximated as normal7.  
 
                                                           
 
 
 
6 Table B1 is at the end of Appendix. 
7 It should be noted here that failing to reject normality does not confirm it. The Wald test used remains to 
be only a test of symmetry and mesokurtosis. However, statistically it is impossible to find the distribution 
of  time-1 value of consumption. Thus, these results were accepted as satisfactory for the distribution in 
question to be “approximated” as normal.  
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C Cash-in Advance Model With A Monetary Exchange Rate  
 
 
Representative agents from each country have the same lifetime utility functions  as in 
original model. For home representative agent it is: 
 
and for foreign representative agent it is: 
 
where the utility functions of U and U* are assumed to be increasing and strictly concave 
functions. β is the subjective discount factor and assumed to be a constant. C and C* are 
the composite real consumption indexes for home and foreign agents respectively. They  
are defined by the following constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) functions:  
 
 
where CJ is the consumption of good J (home and foreign) by the home agent. θ  is the 
elasticity of substitution between foreign and home goods consumed by the home agent. 
ω is the weight that shows the taste of the home agent. The variables with star (*) belong 
to the foreign agent and can be defined similarly.  
( ) ( ) (1C)                                                      )()()( 1001 0 CUCUCUs ss ββ +Ε=Ε=  =Υ
( ) ( ) (2C)                                     )()()()( 1***0**01 0 **** CUCUCUs ss ββ +Ε=Ε=  =Υ
[ ] 1//1/1/1/1 )1( −−− −+= θθθθθθθθ ωω FH CCC
1*/**/1**
*/1*
*/1***/1** )1()(
−
−−






−+=
θθ
θθθθθθ ωω FH CCC
  
120
 
The home-currency price of the home (foreign) good is pH (pF), and the foreign-
currency price of the home(foreign) good is p*H (p*F). The law of one price is assumed to 
hold so that 
 
It is assumed that at the beginning of period 0 the agent divides its initial money 
balances between cash holdings for purchases of goods and assets. At the beginning of 
time 1 there is no such division since time 1 is the final period and all money is spent for 
purchases of goods. By following Grilli& Roubini(1992) it is assumed that the agent who 
transacts in the goods market does not have access to exchange market and thus faces two 
separate constraints. This assumption does not have any affect in the conclusions reached 
in the chapter, it is used just because it is a more realistic one. The good market cash-in 
advance constraints that home agent faces at t = 0,1 are given by 
 
where NH and NF denote home holdings of the home and foreign currencies. Total 
expenditure for home agent in home currency is given by  
 
The cash-in advance constraints that foreign agent faces at t = 0,1 are given by  
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where N*H and N*F denote foreign holdings of the home and foreign currencies. Total 
expenditure for foreign agent in foreign currency is given by  
 
By following the steps described in Appendix A, the home and foreign consumption-
based price indices are found to be equal to the following functions. 
 
 
In assets market, agents do have access to exchange market, thus there is only one 
cash-in advance constraint for each agent. For home agent: 
 
where Aj is the amount of money of country j held by home agent for transactions in asset 
market. For foreign agent: 
 
where A*j is the amount of money of country j held by foreign agent for transactions in 
asset market. 
.11 * )(
*
)(
)(
*
)()(
*
)(
)(
*
)()( tFtF
t
tHtHtF
t
tHtF Cps
CpN
s
NZ +≥+=
[ ] θθθ ωω −−− −+= 1/11*1 ))(1( FH sppP
[ ] *1/1*1***1** ))(1()/( θθθ ωω −−− −+= FH pspP
0)1()1(
)0()0()0()0(
*
)0()0()0()0()0(
==
+++≥+
FH
FFHHFHFH
AA
sQQsPqPqsAA αα
0
111
*
)1(
*
)1(
)0(
*
)0(
)0(
**
)0(
*
)0(
)0(
**
)0(
)0(
*
)0(
==
+++≥+
FH
FFHHFHFH
AA
Q
s
QPq
s
PqA
s
A αα
  
122
 
Since interest rates are positive, cash-in advance constraints in both good and 
asset markets will hold with equality. Thus, the budget constraints are basically same 
with the ones in the original model. For home agent at t = 0: 
 
where  
 
For foreign agent at t = 0: 
 
where 
 
Finally, budget constraints at t =1 for home and foreign agents respectively are given by 
the following equations: 
 
 
The consumption price indexes, P(t) and P*(t), are defined as the minimum 
expenditures such that C(t) and C*(t) are equal to 1. Then Z(t)/P(t) and Z*(t)/P*(t), the ratios of 
spending, measured in home and foreign good terms, to the minimum price of a single 
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unit of consumption index equal to the levels of the total real consumption indexes 
C(t) and C*(t). Thus; 
 
and 
 
If the budget constraints are reformulated by using equations these above 
relationships and dividing the equations by the relevant consumption-based price indexes, 
the budget constraints are converted into those with real terms. Then, for the home agent 
the budget constraints at time 0 and 1 becomes: 
 
 
For the foreign agent the budget constraints at time 0 and 1 becomes: 
 
 
where the new variables are defined as follows:  
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These are exactly the same budget constraints that the original model had before. So 
far only difference between the two models is that while the cash-in advance model 
involves “currencies” in it , the original one is an endowment economy. However, now 
two additional assumptions will be made in the cash-in advance model to make it in the 
lines of study by Grauer, Litzenberger and Stehle (GLS, hereafter) where the exchange 
rate is nothing but good’s price level.  
First, it is assumed that there is perfect substitutability between foreign and home 
goods. In other words, it is assumed that the elasticity of substitution between foreign and 
home goods, θ, is equal to infinity. Then CES function of total consumption simplifies to: 
 
which is subject to the total expenditure function of the form 
 
If the total consumption is maximized with respect to total expenditure it is found that 
relative price of home good to foreign good, i.e. terms of trade, is equal to 1. 
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Foreign side of the problem will also conclude that terms of trade is equal to 1. 
When the goods are perfect substitutes, price indices also simplify to be equal to their 
respective good’s price level. 
 
and 
 
The second equalities come from the equality of terms of trade to 1. 
The second assumption is that there is no inflation in home country and home good 
price is normalized to be equal to 1. Due to this assumption, home price index becomes 
equal to 1 and foreign price index becomes equal to the inverse of exchange rate. Thus:   
 
With these simplifications, the final form of the budget constraints for home and foreign 
agents respectively at time 0 and 1 are the following: 
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where the (I*)-1 is the change in the exchange rate or the inverse of the change in foreign 
good’s price. Thus, the exchange rate is “monetary exchange rate” in this model like in 
GLS’s study.  
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D The Program which Analyzes the Distribution of Time-1 Value of 
Consumption 
 
 
clear all; 
1. Initialize the parameters 
TRIAL=1000; % the number of observations in a sample of consumption 
mu_Pd=100; % mean value of home security’s price 
mu_Pf=100; % mean value of foreign security’s price 
mu_Pfgood=100; %mean value of home good’s price 
mu_Pdgood=100; %mean value of foreign good’s price 
var_Pd=900; %variance of home security’s price 
var_Pf=900; %variance of foreign security’s price 
var_Pfgood=900; %variance of foreign good’s price 
var_Pdgood=900;%variance of home good’s price 
cov_PdPf=810; %covariance between home and foreign security prices 
cov_PdPdg=540; %covariance between home security and good’s prices 
cov_PdPfg=270; %covariance between home security and foreign good’s prices 
cov_PfPdg=90; % covariance between foreign security and home good’s prices 
cov_PfPfg=540; % covariance between foreign security and foreign good’s prices 
cov_PdgPfg=810; % covariance between home and foreign goods prices 
gamma=0.6; %the coefficient that shows the taste of the agent 
theta=1.1; %the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods 
B1=5; B2=5; B3=1; B4=0;%Coefficients in the time-1 value of consumption equation 
Success=0; %the number of Wald test that is smaller than critical value 
 
2 Approximating the Distribution of time-1 value of consumption  
2.1 Creating multivariate normal matrix in the size of 4:1000 
BIR=ones(TRIAL,1); 
means=[mu_Pd mu_Pf mu_Pfgood mu_Pdgood];    %means matrix size=1:4 
sigma=[var_Pd cov_PdPf cov_PdPfg cov_PdPdg; cov_PdPf var_Pf cov_PfPfg cov_PfPdg;cov_PdPfg 
cov_PfPfg var_Pfgood cov_PdgPfg; cov_PdPdg cov_PfPdg cov_PdgPfg var_Pdgood]; %var-cov matrix 
size=4:4 
2.1.1 The prices are not allowed to take values, which are very close to zero. 
for i=1:100, 
 V=0; 
     while min(min(V))<5, 
 V=mvnrnd(means,sigma,TRIAL);   
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     end;  
3 Creating the price index 
P=(gamma+((1-gamma)*(V(:,4)./V(:,3)).^(1-theta))).^(1/(1-theta));  
4 Creating time-1 value of consumption in the size of 1:1000     
Wealth=(B1+(B2*V(:,4)./V(:,3))+(B3*V(:,1))+(B4*(V(:,4)./V(:,3)).*V(:,2)))./P;    
5 The test of normality: Wald test. 
S=skewness(Wealth); 
K=kurtosis(Wealth); 
W(i)=TRIAL*(((S^2)/6)+(((K-3)^2)/24)); 
 if W(i)<=9.6  
 Success=Success+1; 
 end; 
end; 
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